In my last blog I wrote about the theory of cognitive
dissonance. Say, we expect that the world will be destructed on December 21,
2012. However, the prophecy does not come true and two weeks later the world
still exists. We feel quite ill at ease and we try to understand what went
wrong. We think: A supreme being has given the world a second chance. Therefore
we try to convince the people around us that the world can be saved. According
to the theory of cognitive dissonance, we try then to reduce the dissonance
between our expectation and what actually happened.
Suppose now that I am waiting for the train of 10.05
a.m. to Utrecht, where I’ll have an interview for a job. However, the train
doesn’t come nor does the next one fifteen minutes later. So, I call the
Railway Information Service. The telephonist tells me that there is a power
breakdown and that there’ll be no trains for some hours. Next I call the
selection committee that I’ll be too late, since I have to take my car.
What’s the difference? When you don´t belief in the
prophecy, you’ll probably say: In the first case, the facts are adapted to the
belief and in the second case the belief is adapted to the facts. Or something
like that.
That’s clear, you might think. Is it? Take these
examples:
- Many years ago I took part in a 5K track race
(running). One of the other participants was a friend of mine. I finished the
race in a good time but my friend left the race already after two laps. “I
wasn’t in the mood”, he told me, although it took hem three hours of preparation
to start, for the race was in another town. Do you believe him? I think that my
friend himself believed what he said, but I didn’t, for he would be the first to
stop for such a reason.
- You want to buy a new car. You always said: “When I buy
a new car, it must be a yellow one, because not many people have that colour.”
However, the salesman tells you that you have to wait two months for it. Because
your old car actually needs repair, you don’t want to wait so long and you
choose a grey one of the same type. Later you say to yourself: A grey one fits
me much better. Everybody would recognize me from far and say: “There’s John
with his yellow car.”
- Leon Festinger and James Carlsmith asked a group of
students to perform a boring task. The experiment was in fact more complicated,
but the essence is this: After having performed the task, the students were
asked to explain it to other people and to tell them that it was very
interesting. Half of the students got one dollar for this job and the other
half got twenty dollars. When interviewed, the latter told the researchers that
the original task was boring, while those who got one dollar said they liked
it. Apparently, receiving twenty dollars this was a good excuse for telling a
lie. However, the students who received only one dollar had a mental problem:
The low payment did not compensate the psychological burden lying. So they got
the feeling that the original task was interesting.
Without a doubt, I could have chosen better examples,
but what I want to say is this: Often we invent reasons that fit the facts after
they have taken place. Moreover, there is no fundamental distinction between reducing
a cognitive dissonance and giving a “real” explanation. Or rather, the extreme cases
are clearly different and in case of a cognitive dissonance the facts are
adapted to the belief whereas in case of “real” explanations the reasons are adapted
to the facts. But between these extremes, the reasons can be more a bit of this
or more a bit of that. There the difference is actually gradual and
reducing a cognitive dissonance is something everybody often does to some extent.
Something happens that we did not expect or did not want to happen and we have
to act or form an opinion. So we rationalize. However, this doesn’t imply that
we throw dust in our own eyes. This may happen but often our reasons are good
reasons.
***
Since I have heard of the theory of cognitive
dissonance I often think: Is this thought of mine a case of cognitive
dissonance reduction or do I really mean it?
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