Are beliefs brain states?

In 1998 Andy Clark and David Chalmers published their article “The Extended Mind” in which they defended the view that the mind is not only in the brain, but also in the world around. This so-called extended mind thesis was the start of a discussion that lasts until today. A more radical version of this view is the enactivist approach, which I discussed two weeks ago. An important advocate of this theory is Shaun Gallagher. Although the actual discussion started only after Clark and Chalmers had presented their paper, they had forerunners. One of them was Lynne Rudder Baker. She called her account “practical realism” and she gave a comprehensive explanation of her view in her book Explaining Attitudes.

Baker’s practical realism is an attack on the – then – standard view that states that someone’s beliefs are literally somewhere in the brain. How this can be is explained by different theories in different ways, but, so Baker, “[w]hat Standard View theories have in common is the thesis that each instance of each belief is identical with, or is constituted by, an instance of a particular brain state.” In short: “Beliefs are brain states” (p. 12). Although without a doubt, so Baker, it is true that “[h]aving certain neural states is, presumably, necessary for people to have beliefs ... it does not follow that for a person to have a particular belief there is a neural state that constitutes that belief.” “[A] belief is a global state of a whole person, not of any proper part of a person, such as the brain”. (pp. 153-4) So, “[h]orses win races; legs have states. Having certain leg states is, presumably, necessary for horses to win races; but it doesn’t follow that for a horse to win a particular race, there is a leg state that constitutes the winning of the race.” (p. 154)

An attitude such as a belief, so Baker continues, can be compared with a state of financial health or a state of physical fitness. To take the first example, only in marginal cases your financial health has to do with the state of your bank account. It’s a relational concept: If the amount on your bank account is above a certain minimum, your financial state is more a matter of your pattern of spending, your financial wishes and the state of the economy (inflation, national income) than the sum of money you possess. In the same manner, a belief is not to be identified with any particular internal state of the believer. (ibid.) In enactivist terms, having a belief supposes not only a brain, but also a body and a world in which the brain and body exist. Seen this way, Baker has paved the way for undermining the “standard view”.

Nevertheless, one case discussed by her seems not to agree with the extended mind thesis and the enactivist approach. Peter asks Paul for Mary’s telephone number. Paul consults a directory, as always, and produces the correct number: 06-54321. Since Paul always has to consult a directory, “[i]ntuitively”, so Baker, Paul does not have the belief that Mary’s number is [06-54321] but only a belief how to find the number” (p. 161) and she explains that this is in keeping with practical realism. However, does the fact that Paul never remembers Mary’s telephone number makes that he does not have the belief that it is 06-54321 but only the belief how to get it? Let me take the main example from Clark’s and Chalmers’ article. Otto suffers from Alzheimer’s disease. Therefore he carries always a notebook with him and every time he learns some new information, he writes it down. When he needs some old information, he looks it up. The notebook contains also Mary’s telephone number, so when Peter asks for it, Otto looks in his notebook and says “06-54321”. However, Fred knows Mary’s number by heart, so when Peter asks Fred for Mary’s telephone number, Fred produces it by heart without any hesitation and faultless. This made Clark and Chalmers conclude, that there is no fundamental difference between what Otto does and what Fred does, but there is only the practical difference that Otto consults the extended part of his brain, and that Fred consults the internal part of his brain: In both cases we can say that the telephone number is in the brain. But if this is true, and if we apply this reasoning to Baker’s example of Peter and Paul, we can say that Paul has not only the belief how to find Mary’s telephone number but also the belief that her number is 06-54321, just as Fred has this belief. This is this fully in line with Baker’s view that a belief is not simply a state of the brain but that it is a global state of a whole person related to the world around and especially to that part of the world that is within his or her reach. So, if we correct Baker’s view this way, it is only one step more to a fully developed theory that the mind is extended if not enactivist and this makes that Baker is a forerunner of these views.

Sources

- Andy Clark and David Chalmers,  “The Extended Mind”, in Analysis, Vol. 58, No. 1 (Jan., 1998), pp. 7-19. Ook op website http://www.alice.id.tue.nl/references/clark-chalmers-1998.pdf

- Lynne Rudder Baker, Explaining attitudes. A practical approach to the mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.