As my readers certainly will have noticed, one of my
main fields of interest is the philosophy of action, so the field of philosophy
that thinks about the possibility of intentional action and about what happens
if we say that we act for a reason. Aristotle was the first who thought about
such questions and since then the discussion has never ended. Or rather,
sometimes the problem seemed forgotten but then it flared up again. However,
this all is about what persons individually do. But how about groups? Do groups
have intentions more or less in the way as individuals have them? Some
philosophers like Tuomela, Bratman and Gilbert answer this question in a
positive way in one way or another and they say that groups certainly have if
we talk about small groups. Is this right? In order to examine this question
let me start with a case that John Searle treats in a contribution to the debate.
I have changed the case a lot, however. Here I cannot refer to individual
contributors to the discussion. I simply present my view.
Smith and Jones,
who work in a restaurant, are preparing a hollandaise sauce together. Jones is
stirring while Smith slowly pours in the ingredients. Some philosophers would say
now that Smith and Jones have a kind of collective intention to prepare the
sauce. While they are busy, Baker calls Jones and tells him that he is wanted
on the telephone. Since the sauce will be ruined if Jones stops stirring, Baker
takes his place. Does it make any difference if the sauce will be ready before
Jones returns or that he is called away for an urgent case and doesn’t return? I
think that in both cases it is not simply so that there is a collective intention
that makes that Baker and Smith do what they do. For I think that what Baker
does is not preparing the hollandaise sauce as such but helping Smith and
Jones. Baker, who is the switchboard operator in the restaurant, doesn’t know
what a hollandaise sauce is. Therefore Smith tells Baker what he has to do and in
this way the sauce is prepared. However, actually Baker doesn’t know what he is
doing but he simply follows Smith’s instructions. He is just making physical
moves and his intention is only helping Smith and Jones. By means of making the
moves that Smith says he has to perform, Baker helps Smith and Jones. Helping
is Baker’s intention. His intention is different from the intentions of Smith
and Jones each, who wanted to make a hollandaise sauce. Therefore, even if we might have had first a group
with the collective intention of making a hollandaise sauce, namely the group
consisting of Smith and Jones, after that Jones has been replaced by Baker we don’t
have a group with such an intention any longer, for Baker doesn’t know well
what he is doing and that the result of his stirring is that a hollandaise
sauce is prepared (in cooperation with Smith). Smith’s intention is pouring in
the ingredients so that is hollandaise sauce is prepared, while Baker’s
intention is helping Smith and Jones, or replacing Jones, if you like.
Nevertheless, we get a hollandaise sauce in the end by the joint activities of Smith and Baker (and Jones, of course, who did
his part, too, and maybe comes back before Smith and Baker have finished).
Now we can
talk yet a lot about the identity of the group Smith-Jones-Baker, but I think
that anyway we cannot deny that here we have a group of people who fulfil a
task successfully together, but nevertheless not all of them know what the
purpose of the group is. They simply do the prescribed tasks. The upshot is
that people can work successfully together in a group and as group, but nevertheless
there doesn’t need to be a collective intention for this.
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