There is hardly any western philosopher who writes
about Christmas. It’s a bit strange, since Christmas is the most important
holiday in the western world, even though for many people it’s no longer celebrated
because of its religious meaning. It has turned into an important secular
holiday, especially to be celebrated in the family. In this way Christmas is
gradually becoming important all over the world, also in non-Christian
countries. Therefore, it’s remarkable that all major (western) philosophers philosophically
ignore it, although much can be said about it. Even such a devote
roman-catholic like Montaigne usually kept away from writing on Christmas,
probably because he didn’t want to be involved in the religious conflicts of
his time. He was afraid of being accused to support the Reformation, if he
would present a moderate point of view.
It’s true that Sartre wrote a kind of Nativity play,
when he was interned as a prisoner of war in Germany during Christmas 1940, but
actually it was an act of solidarity with his fellow prisoners and a rejection
of Nazism. But it is an exception and in fact only Wittgenstein devotes occasionally
some words to Christmas. We know that he often celebrated it with his family –
anyway before he definitively moved to England – but that he didn’t like it.
However, during the First World War, so exactly hundred years ago, he was not
at home, since he was a soldier. Wittgenstein wrote a diary during these years,
and it would be interesting to know what he did on December 25 or 26, 1916, but
alas, this part of his diary has been lost or he didn’t write about it. What we
do know is what he did during Christmas two years before. These were the days
that soldiers on the Western Front fraternized and celebrated Christmas
together with the enemy, to the great annoyance of the generals, who succeeded
to suppress this fraternization in later years. But in December 1914
Wittgenstein was in Eastern Europe and his post was behind the front line at a
quiet place. So even if he would have
liked to fraternize with the Russian enemy – which I doubt – he couldn’t do
that.
Wittgenstein tells us that on Christmas Day 1914 he
takes the midday meal in the officers’ mess. Was it special Christmas dinner? I
don’t know, for he doesn’t mention what he ate. And Wittgenstein tells us that
“he worked a bit”. The next day, on Boxing Day, he “hardly worked”, so he
writes, and in the evening he went to a coffee house with a young man whom he
had met, and he had an interesting discussion with the guy.
It needs some explanation what Wittgenstein means when
he writes that he “worked”. He doesn’t mean that he did his tasks as a soldier,
but that he worked on the manuscript of what would later become his Tractatus logico-philosophicus. We know
even exactly what he wrote then:
“The proposition says something” is identical with: It
has a particular relation to reality, whatever this may be. And if this reality
is given and also that relation, then the sense of the proposition is known,
"pvq" has a different relation to reality from "p.q", etc.
The possibility of the proposition is, of course,
founded on the principle of signs as going proxy for objects. [Cf. 4.0312.]
Thus in the proposition something has something else
as its proxy. But there is also the common cement. My fundamental thought is
that the logical constants are not proxies. That the logic of the fact cannot
have anything as its proxy. [See 4.0312.]
[from Notebooks
1914-1916]
In the Tractatus
(4.0312) this would become:
The possibility of propositions is based upon the
principle of the representation of objects by signs.
My fundamental thought is that the “logical constants”
do not represent. That the logic of the facts cannot be represented.
So, during Christmas 1914, four months after he had
voluntarily joined the army, Wittgenstein was working on the most fundamental
thoughts of his early philosophy, namely that a language represents the world
it depicts. This idea would become one of the basic ideas of analytical
philosophy. Even though today we will not take it in a literal sense any
longer, isn’t it still considered true that the words we speak represent at
least our view on the world and how we want that others – the persons we are
speaking to – see it?
As a Wittgenstein student this is very interesting to learn about; thank you for sharing!
ReplyDeleteThank you for telling me, Jens. And then you must certainly read the book by Baum mentioned in the blog. As far as I know Wittgenstein's personal diary hasn't been published elsewhere. Also the other content of this book presents an interesting light on Wittgenstein and the publication policy by the editors of his work.
ReplyDeleteHenk