War propaganda

Women of Lancashire. British recruitment poster, First World War, 1915.

 Source: Imperial War Museums, Image: IWM (Art.IWM PST 6061).

Since there has been war, there has been war propaganda, for war must be justified by those who choose to fight. Justifying war has especially become important, when wars were no longer fought by professional soldiers and mercenaries but by armies of conscripts, and since the rise of the mass media. The introduction of the conscript army by Napoleon made that basically the whole male population of a country could be called up for military service. The rise of mass media made that now everybody could know what was going on in the world and what their soldiers had to fight for and to die for. This made that in order to start and continue a war the consent of the public opinion was required.
The first major war in which mass media were used for war propaganda was the First World War (WW1; 1914-1918). Propaganda became part of the war policy of all fighting countries. It was especially important in the United Kingdom. Not only was not everybody there convinced of the necessity of the war, but moreover, when WW1 began, the country had not yet a conscript army (this was introduced only in 1916), so in order to get enough soldiers, young men had to be convinced that it was their patriotic duty to enlist.
It was no surprise then that, once WW1 had ended, just a British war critic, Arthur Ponsonby, wrote a book in which he analysed war propaganda and unravelled the lies conceived and spread to convince people of the necessity of the war, not only in the UK but in all major warring countries then. This book, Falsehood in Wartime, inspired the Belgian political scientist Anne Morelli to summarise the mechanism of war propaganda described by Ponsonby in ten basic principles in her book Principes élémentaires de propagande de guerre (Elementary principles of war propaganda). For propaganda was not only a major characteristic of WW1, but since then its use has spread more and more; during the Second World War, the Vietnam War, the war in former Yugoslavia, the Gulf Wars, till the present wars between Russia and Ukraine and in Gaza. Therefore, it is still worth taking note of the basics of war propaganda, since they are still applied, when political leaders try to convince us of the need to start a war or to participate in it.
What then are the principles of war propaganda?

1. We do not want war but “they” want it. A reason to go to war that accuses the enemy is often invented, or relevant facts for the war are omitted.
2. Our adversary is solely responsible for the war. It is our adversary who harms our rights, values, territory, etc.; ignoring, for instance, that we, too were already preparing for war.
3. The enemy’s leader is evil and resembles the devil. You cannot hate a whole group or country, so it’s better to direct the hatred to the leader of the enemy country.
4. We are defending a noble cause and not our personal interests. We have higher values than our enemy and must defend them, for example. Or, we defend human rights, not the access to the oil in the enemy country.
5. The enemy deliberately commits atrocities; our mistakes, are not intentional. Not only is it so that the enemy is said to commit atrocities; even if civilian victims are the consequence of mistakes, they are still seen as deliberate atrocities, while if we commit them, we call them “collateral damage”.
6. The enemy uses illegal weapons, like weapons that are “unnecessarily” cruel or forbidden by international law. If we use them, it’s only because they use them.
7. We suffer very few losses; the enemy’s losses are enormous. If our losses are bigger than those of the enemy, it is better not to say so and to hide our real losses, because telling the truth is not good for our morals.
8. Artists and intellectuals support our cause. If such smart people do, why not you?
9. Our cause is sacred. We fight for God, for higher values, for humanity...
10. Everyone who questions our propaganda is a traitor and helps the enemy. There are good guys and there are bad guys. Who isn’t for us is against us. People who ask critical questions – even if they are clearly “on our side” – are considered to undermine “our cause”, also when their questions are justified and should be asked. Criticism is not allowed and it is punished, also in democratic societies.

The aim of war propaganda actually is, so Morelli, “creating a state of shared hypnosis, where we are all in the virtuous camp of the deeply offended ‘Good’ ”, and this apparently is a pathological need. Moreover, it is also possible that the war makers themselves construct this propaganda not purposefully but really believe it. However, this doesn’t make it true. Nevertheless, it is possible that some or even all of the propagandistic statements are true. For instance, maybe our adversary really is solely responsible for the war. As Morelli writes, “It is possible that only one of the two camps is lying and that only one of the two camps has really been attacked, without really wanting a war. In short, the question of who the aggressor is and who is the victim remains particularly delicate.”
Since what is pure propaganda and what is true often is difficult to say and often becomes clear only afterwards, the only thing one can do is being critical. Is it true what the political leaders say, when they want to start a war? Do they hide facts? Are the “facts” invented in order to have a cause of war? Such questions are important, but they are not without risk. Finding the truth can take time, and a being hypercritical and extremely cautious can paralyse any action, even when action is urgent. Nonetheless, systematic doubt is the only thing we can do to avoid falling in the propaganda trap; not only in case of a war or a threatening war. As Morelli writes: “It seems to me that systematic doubt is a good antidote to the daily attempts of the media to persuade us during international wars, ideological conflicts and social conflicts.” Not only then, I think.

Sources: The links in the text plus Wikipedia.

Random quote
Those who have no self-confidence call for the big man, the dictator, and for a dictator, people shout almost everywhere today.

Rudolf Rocker (1873-1958), German anarchist and writer

Naturalistic fallacy

The naturalistic fallacy is usually seen as the inverse of the moralistic fallacy, though some see the latter as a variant of the naturalistic fallacy. Whether the one or the other is the case is not relevant in this blog, since here I want to discuss the reasoning error implied in the naturalistic fallacy; not its philosophical status.
Someone commits a naturalistic fallacy if this person argues that if something is natural it must be good or it ought to be. That is the positive version of the naturalistic fallacy, for just like for the moralistic fallacy, there is also a negative version. It says that what is not natural must not be good or it ought to not be. So:

X is, therefore X is good.
or
X is, therefore X ought to be.
and
X is not, therefore X is not good.
or
X is not, therefore X ought not to be.

The term “naturalistic fallacy” was coined by G.E. Moore in his Principia Media (p. 62). Moore argued that what is natural must not be confused with what is good, and that natural and normative properties are metaphysically different. With Ryle, we can say that they belong to different metaphysical categories and that we would make a category mistake, if we would deduce the one from the other. However, Moore was not the first philosopher who discussed the naturalistic fallacy. Already Hume argued that it is not allowed to jump from is to ought statements. On the other hand, even famous philosophers commit this fallacy, like John Stuart Mill, who argued that “human nature is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not either a part of happiness or a means of happiness”, and therefore “happiness is the sole end of human action, and the promotion of it the test by which to judge all human conduct; from whence it necessarily follows that it must be the criterion of morality.” (from McCraw, p. 193; italics mine)
Or another example:
“Nature gives people diseases and sickness; therefore, it is morally wrong to interfere with nature and treat sick people with medicine.
Explanation: If we break this down, we can say that the claim that nature gives people diseases and sickness is a declaration of what is (i.e., a natural property of the world). From this, we are deriving an ought (i.e., we ought not interfere...). The wording and order of these arguments can be confusing, but remember that the underlying fallacy here is the deduction of an ought from an is.
[However,] we go against nature (or what is) all the time. We cannot sometimes use nature as a moral baseline and at other times condemn her for her careless attitude and indifference toward the human race.” (source)
Sometimes it seems that “a naturalistic claim or property to a normative one won’t be fallacious or defective.” (McCraw, p. 195). McCraw discusses a few examples, but to my mind then in fact something else is the case. Instead of discussing McCraw’s examples, I want to take one that is more relevant to the current world situation, in order to make this clear.
I think that many of my readers will agree with the claim that the natural environment is deteriorating rapidly and therefore we ought to stop it. Nevertheless, at first glance, this argument seems to be false, since it is a clear case of a naturalistic fallacy. The reasoning is “fallacious or defective”, to use McCraw’s words, and I think that taken literally it is. However, one can read this sentence also as an elliptic statement, which stands for much more than what these thirteen words literally say. To make this clear, let me split up the statement into two parts: (1) The natural environment is deteriorating rapidly and (2) We ought to stop it. Then (1) is a summary of the state of the natural environment as described by many climate researchers, biologists, etc. and (2) summarizes the view or opinion of many people who think that the environmental degradation is bad for the world and for ourselves, and therefore ought to be stopped. So, (1) is a factual statement and (2) is a normative statement. Seen as a logical statement, the argument “(1) therefore (2)” is a naturalistic fallacy, indeed. However, seen as a practical statement, the argument “(1) therefore (2)” is sound, for a practical argument reasons what must be done on the basis of the known facts and our views. Therefore, if an argument reasons from a natural fact or a statement about what is natural to what ought to be done or what is good, first we must decide whether it is a logical or a practical argument, before we can say whether or not it is a naturalistic fallacy. Only as a logical argument it can be a naturalistic fallacy. As a practical argument it says what must be done. Of course, a practical argument can be unsound or false, but then for other reasons.

Sources and further reading
- Ethics Explainer: Naturalistic Fallacy
- McCraw, Benjamin W., “Naturalistic Fallacy”, in Robert Arp; Steven Barbone; Michael Bruce (eds.), Bad arguments. 100 of the most important fallacies in Western philosophy. Oxford, etc.: Wiley Blackwell, 2019; pp. 193-195.
- Naturalistic Fallacy, in Logically Fallacious
- Naturalistic Fallacy, in Wikipedia

Random quote
Those who do not think themselves are thought by others.

Rudolf Rocker (1873-1958), German anarchist and writer

Moralistic fallacy

Now that I have given quite a lot of attention to morality in my last blogs (and not only in my last blogs). I think that it’s the right moment to treat the so-called “moralistic fallacy”, a fallacy that is related to wishful thinking. It is the inverse of the naturalistic fallacy, also called the is/ought fallacy.
There are two versions of the moralistic fallacy, a positive one and a negative one. The positive version says that it occurs when someone asserts “that something is a particular way because it should or ought to be that way.” (Foresman) We could also say: The moralistic fallacy occurs when someone asserts that the way things should be or ought to be is the way they naturally are. The negative version says that the moralistic fallacy occurs when someone asserts “that something cannot be a particular way because it should not or ought not to be that way.” (ibid.) Or, alternatively, what should not be or ought not to be in a particular way is not or will not be so. The fallacy implies that what is immoral is unnatural. The moralistic fallacy is closely related to wishful thinking, as said: The speaker wishes the world to be in a certain way – in this case in a certain moral way – so the world is in that way. The – moral – wish makes speaker blind to the facts.
A variation of the moralistic fallacy is the claim that certain behaviour is natural, since it is based on certain moral values, even if there is contradicting evidence; or a moral claim is simply used to justify a factual claim about the world. It can be found in legal reasoning, prudential reasoning, or reasoning regarding proper etiquette, aesthetics, humour, appropriate emotional responses, etc. I don’t like it to shave myself, so I do it only now and then. In the past, people often saw me as a “tramp” since a decent guy must be well-shaven. At the border, I was always checked. But since several years this has changed, for nowadays, looking unshaven (without having a real beard) is for men in fashion. Although I am still the same person, people see me now in a different way. A moral idea determined a social fact in the minds of those who had it; mistakenly. And, another example, who doesn’t like sometimes a distasteful joke? That the joke is distasteful doesn’t make it not funny just for that reason, although many people think it does.
More commonly, so Foresman, the moralistic fallacy occurs in everyday thinking when one assumes that what is right is what will be. For instance, this happens if a teacher thinks that the students will not cheat because it is not allowed. Or if someone thinks that people will vote because it is their moral obligation. However, it is not so that moral views cannot have practical consequences. They can. So it’s quite possible that the students don’t cheat, since it’s not allowed and therefore you simply don’t do it. Or that people vote, because they feel a moral obligation to do so. Also promises are often fulfilled because you must keep your promises. In other words, morality can affect how the world is and what the facts will be but it doesn’t necessarily do so.

Sources
- Galen Foresman, “Moralistic Fallacy”, in Robert Arp; Steven Barbone; Michael Bruce (eds.), Bad arguments. 100 of the most important fallacies in Western philosophy. Oxford, etc.: Wiley Blackwell, 2019; pp. 371-373.
- Moralistic Fallacy, in Wikipedia.

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We don't sink quickly but regularly.

Maurits Dekker (1896-1962), Dutch author

Morality and passion

In his A Treatise of Human Nature David Hume famously wrote: “’Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.” (Book II, Part III, Section 3) Although, at first sight, this seems unreasonable, nevertheless at second sight it isn’t. Or rather it is not so when we agree with Hume’s argument. For according to Hume, we are guided by our passions: “A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification.” So, passions are basic and “’tis impossible, therefore, that [a] passion can be oppos’d by or contradictory to truth and reason…” According to Hume, there are only two exceptions that a passion can be contrary to reason. First, when it is only supposed to exist but in reality it doesn’t, and, second, when the means chosen to achieve a passion are wrong. Thus seen, indeed, it is not irrational “to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger”, but also it is also “not contrary to reason for me to chuse [= choose] my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me. ‘Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledg’d lesser good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection for the former than for the latter.” Indeed, these examples make the preference of the scratching of my finger to the destruction of the world somewhat less banal and better to understand as “not contrary to reason”, though, I think, it can be argued that Hume’s examples are irrational because just in these cases reason can undermine the passion in view of Hume’s two exceptions.

Nevertheless, I think that there is a flaw in Hume’s argument. In fact, according to Hume, reason is a kind of executive agency of the passions, also in case of the two exceptions. However, it is quite possible that reason is also an “original existence” alongside passions. According to Hume, “reason alone can never produce any action, or give rise to volition” (or prevent volition), and just this makes reason subordinate to and an executive agency of the passions. But I think that reason itself can be seen as a kind of passion, namely as a drive to have to be rational. And just as a combat between passions is possible (for example between love and revenge; like in my last blog, when Otto tried to kill Poppea), it is also imaginable that reason fights with a passion, especially when such a passion can be seen as unreasonable from another perspective that is also basic. One such other perspective is morality. Morality is independent of reason, so Hume, and “morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions.” (II, III, 2) In this way, morality can even be seen as more basic than the passions. Then, in a derived sense, not to want to have my finger scratched in favour of the salvation of the world is as yet irrational if it is contrary to my moral principles (and therefore immoral). It is true, from the narrow perspective that only passions are basic reason can only be the executive agent of a passion. However, as an independent driving force it can be used as the executive agent of any basic drive, or original existence, as Hume calls it. From such a wider perspective, the scratch of my finger can certainly be irrational and unreasonable as well, for instance, when we take our moral values as our starting point or see them even as preceding our passions.

When I wanted to announce my last blog in several social media, as I always do, I started to write “Power is often preferred to morality” and then Hume’s statement popped up in my mind, which, in the end, I didn’t add. But look around how people behave, politicians in the first place. How many behave as if they don’t want to have their fingers scratched (or maybe their souls) and prefer the destruction of the world instead, ignoring morality. Isn’t that a crime?

Random quote
When a communist opponent said that the proletariat will determine what we’ll do, Albert de Jong replied: “When you say that the proletariat will determine what we’ll do, in fact this means that I, the dictator, will determine what we’ll do, while, when I say that I will determine what I’ll do, this may sound individualistic, but only then it is really the proletariat that determines what we’ll do.”

Albert de Jong (1891-1970), Dutch anarchist

Morality and power

Oradour-sur-Glane, France: Massacred and destroyed by the Nazis out of revenge,
 10 June 1944.

Being moral or exercising power. Often it is a contradiction and often we think that there is no other option than to choose the one or the other; in daily life, let alone as a politician, certainly if you are a politician at the top of the – or a – power structure. And how often don’t we opt for power instead of morality? I am afraid that too often we do. Especially, many at the top choose power, even in case morality is a real option.
I had to think of this when, two weeks ago, I saw Monteverdi’s opera L’Incoronazione di Poppea in the City Theatre of Utrecht, performed by the Dutch Touring Opera. The opera was first performed in 1643 in Venice. The musical introduction to the opera presents it as a battle between morality and love, in which love wins, but actually the opera is about morality and power, and, as so often, power wins. I think it is what Claudio Monteverdi (1567-1643) wanted to tell us, but in his time, in Italy in the first part of the 16th century, often you could not say your message openly, so he concealed the real message behind a more innocent theme, namely the struggle between Virtu and Amor.
But first the story (from the website above):

The Roman emperor Nero is in love with the courtesan Poppea. He wants to take her to wife and cast off his lawful wife Ottavia. Nero’s teacher Seneca considers these plans morally and politically objectionable and must pay for his opposition with forced suicide. The desperate Ottavia decides to have Poppea murdered and forces Otto, Poppea’s former lover, to perform the attack. Otto seeks the help of Drusilla, whom he had left for Poppea at the time. Torn with love and resentment, Otto, wrapped in Drusilla’s cloak, sneaks up on the sleeping Poppea. However, the murder is foiled by Amor, who promises to ensure that Poppea is crowned Empress that same day. Drusilla, whose cloak has been recognized, is arrested and taken to Nero, who questions her sharply. To protect Otto, she takes all the blame. When Otto hears this, he tells the true facts. He is exiled, and Drusilla may accompany him as a reward for her loyalty. Nero now has good reason to cast out Ottavia and banishes her from Rome for good, and Poppea is crowned empress.

In short, L’Incoronazione di Poppea is an opera in which moral values are put aside and power, greed and relations determine what the personages do. At first sight, it seems like another fictional complicated opera story, but in fact it is based on historical facts. Nero really did take Poppea, the wife of his friend Otto, for instance, and cast out his wife Ottavia. And Seneca, the teacher of Nero, was really forced to commit suicide, though in reality because Nero thought that he had taken part in a conspiracy (whether Seneca really did is not certain). Etc. But what Monteverdi (and his librettist Giovanni Francesco Busenello) presents us here actually is a complicated network of power and intrigues. Ted Huffman, the director of this performance of the opera, explains that the opera is about political and moral questions that are still relevant today: “At the moment that Europe balances on the brink of war, we are concerned with questions such as: What happens if our moral values are no longer worth anything? … What can we do, while we see that the world order collapses? Can reason and goodness stop the decline? How to deal with the violent destruction of a social order by a psychopathic autocrat? Just these are the questions presented by Monteverdi in the opera.” But actually, it is not only Nero, it is not only the autocrat, who uses power at the cost of morality, but all those who become included in the play and so get involved in it, are not only onlookers and victims. They are participants. Huffman: “For example, is it so that Poppea becomes immoral, because Nero uses all his means to separate from his wife Ottavia, so that he can marry Poppea, … [or] is it so that Poppea can live with Nero’s misdeeds and abuse of power? We can ask such questions also for other personages. Take Seneca: Isn’t it maybe so that he tried to prevent the repudiation of Ottavia in order to keep his own power at the court?” We can say something like that of every personage in the opera: Each one thinks to have reasons to use power at the cost of morality. “None of the characters in the opera thinks to be guilty or blameworthy – just like in real life, when nobody wants to be the bad guy”, and, as I want to add, nobody thinks to be a bad guy or bad girl. This is so for Poppea, and for Seneca and for all characters in the opera. Nobody, once involved in the play, considers the possibility that there may be other options and everybody stays on the stage and plays his or her part. Nevertheless, other options were possible, for wasn’t it so that a few years later the real historic Nero was deposed by the Senate (the equivalent of the modern parliament or Congress) because of his misconduct? Power doesn’t need to exclude morality. It’s something to think about, even when you have become involved in a play in which you didn’t want to have a part.
Need I explain more about the relevance of L’Incoronazione di Poppea? With this opera, Monteverdi wanted to criticize the political and social world of his days, but also 400 years later it still holds up a mirror to us. 

Random quote
Such as make it their business to oversee human actions, do not find themselves in anything so much perplexed as to reconcile them and bring them into the world’s eye with the same lustre and reputation; for they commonly so strangely contradict one another that it seems impossible they should proceed from one and the same person.

Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592)

Euphemism

Person without permanent residence

Who controls the language controls the mind. Philosophically, there is a lot to say about this statement that undermines its truth (For instance: Who controls the language of the controller?). However, despite philosophical doubts, in practice it works often that way. One who has best described the working of mind control by language is George Orwell. His 1984 and Animal Farm have seldom been so relevant as today. Whether they have read Orwell’s works or haven’t, many politicians know the value of this statement, and they apply it; not only for convincing the public and their potential voters but also for manipulating them. Language is often used for pushing people in a certain direction, while concealing their real intentions; by politicians in the first place, but certainly not only by them.
Manipulating the public is often done by means of fallacies: Argumentations in which the conclusions don’t follow from the premisses. Another way to manipulate others with words is by giving them a vague meaning. Often there isn’t much difference between the one and the other. Using vague words often leads to fallacies. Actually, if your intention is to manipulate with words, it’s not important whether these words belong to the first category or to the second. Only the effect counts.
Manipulating your public by softening the meaning of your words or with vague meanings means using euphemisms. A euphemism is “a delicate, indirect, inoffensive, or vague word or phrase that takes the place of one that is unpleasant, blunt, offensive or graphic.” (Baltzer-Jaray, p. 270) Euphemisms are often used, when you don’t want to hurt the feelings of those you are talking to and want to be polite, or when you want to avoid directly talking about certain subjects, like death and sex. However, it is not what I want to talk about now. Here I want to discuss euphemisms as instruments for thought manipulation and by this the way people behave. I’ll concentrate on the former and let the behavioural aspect implicit. Then we see (following Baltzer-Jaray) that euphemistic language is used for:
- preventing inappropriately stirring people’s emotions by using neutral terms like calling homeless people “people without permanent residence”, or mentally disabled people “people with abilities”. When many years ago the first migrant workers from Southern Europe and Morocco arrived in the Netherlands, they were called “guest workers”, concealing that they were poorly paid, did often dirty and heavy work and were badly housed.
- swaying people’s opinions or emotions to a particular side, for example when torture is called “enhanced interrogation”, or non-combatant civilian victims in a war are called “collateral damage”.
- concealing a person’s role in responsibility for a bad deed, for example when it is said that someone has not been killed but “neutralized”, or that a government has “disinformed” the parliament instead of having lied.
Such euphemisms are “fallacious”, so Baltzer-Jaray, “because they are intentionally used to conceal the truth and obscure any real meaning; they are soft language used to mask or downplay warranted emotional force.” In other words, they are instruments of manipulation. They make you think less critically and suppress your feelings. That’s the political side. As said, in daily life euphemism are also often used, and there they can have a positive side as well. However, in advertising often weasel words are used to seduce you to buy certain products. Such words “appear to say something truthful or meaningful, but really they conceal truth and meaning”. So, if a product “combats wrinkles” and “dermatology experts agree skin appears smoother”, such a recommendation in an advertisement seldom says to what extent it will probably be successful (1%, 25%, 75%?) and which experts say so and what is meant by “skin appears smoother”.
Euphemistic words and expressions are often used to mislead. Once you have fallen into the trap and believe them in their literal sense and doesn’t see the deception behind the euphemistically used words, maybe you’ll vote for a politician because of these words, or buy a product that is misleadingly advertised to be good. And that’s just what the politician, advertiser or whoever wants to mislead you with euphemisms intends.

Sources
- Baltzer-Jaray, Kimberley, “Euphemism”, in Arp, Robert; Steven Barbone; Michael Bruce (eds.), Bad arguments. 100 of the most important fallacies in Western philosophy. Oxford, etc.: Wiley Blackwell, 2019; pp. 270-272.
- “Euphemism”, in Wikipedia.

Random quote
The brain is part of the mind; but the mind is not part of the brain.

Markus Gabriel (1980-)

How to stop an autocrat

Vilnius, Lithuania: Bronze sculpture Aukojimas (The Sacrifice) created by sculptor Darius Braziunas and architect Arturas Asauskas. Memorial near the Vilnius TV tower to the thirteen people who lost their lives in 1991 when Soviet troops seized the tower during the Lithuanian struggle for independence from the Soviet Union.

The political philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) developed the theory that a state could best be governed by an absolute sovereign, in order to prevent the societal breakdown by interhuman conflicts. Such an absolute ruler would best represent the interests of the people. Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), on the other hand, was rather an advocate of a democratic government system, in which the interests of the people were represented by democratically elected institutions. Although in the days of Hobbes and Spinoza nearly all countries were governed by authoritarian rulers, if not absolute sovereigns, from then on the number of more or less democratically governed countries increased, especially since the 19th century, till in the early 21st century most countries were democratic states. Democracy seemed to be a viable system that represented the interests of its subjects best. For although in Hobbes’s view absolute rulers should represent the interests of their subjects, in practice they served mainly their own interests and those of their cliques, to the detriment of the interests of the people they were supposed to look after. In view of this, it was to be expected that a democracy, once established, would be a stable political system. Nevertheless, the opposite turns out to be true. Since a few years, for all kinds of reasons (which I don’t want to discuss here, and which are, moreover, not always clear), there are tendencies to authoritarianism if not dictatorship in many countries; even to that extent that again most political systems are no longer democratic but autocratic. And as in the past, the new authoritarian leaders – whatever they say – do not represent the interests of their voters (for most new autocrats have been elected in democratic elections) but the interests of themselves and their cliques. Therefore, many who have elected these leaders feel themselves tricked, if not worse. For how many of those who have brought Putin to power wanted war with Ukraine? Also in the USA opposition to president Trump is growing, including among those who voted for him. And who in the USA really wants that the power of the judicial institutions, one of the pillars of democracy, is undermined? However, these are reactions afterwards, when it is or can be already too late. Nevertheless, the behaviour of autocrats, especially when initially democratically elected, seldom comes from nowhere. It could have been foreseen.
The Russian-America journalist Masha Gessen has experienced both a long ruling “old” autocrat (Putin), and the rise of a new autocrat in a democratic country (Trump). Already in 2016, just after Trump’s election as president of the USA, Gessen wrote the article “Autocracy: Rules for Survival”, with six rules how to foresee and to survive an authoritarian political system (adapted):

Rule #1: Believe the autocrat. He means what he says. Whenever you find yourself thinking, or hear others claiming, that he is exaggerating, this is our innate tendency to reach for a rationalization. Indeed, especially now during his second term, with a majority in Congress and having won the presidential election convincingly, Trump carries out exactly those autocratic measures he had already promised during his campaign. His radical position was not a posture. We have been warned. Therefore, it will be foolish to think that during the rest of his term as president Trump is not going to do what he has promised during his campaign.
Rule #2: Do not be taken in by small signs of normality. Sometimes an autocrat must give in to pressure or because the situation is against him, but it is always a matter of two steps forward, one step back, and then again two steps forward, etc.
Rule #3: Institutions will not save you. See, how the US Congress is paralysed by Trumps actions. See, how autocrats manipulate or manipulated the judicial institutes in Poland, Hungary and now also in the USA, not to speak of Russia. They are made the long arm of the autocrat. It is the same for the free press and the universities, institutes that have always been seen as representatives of freedom. The first thing an autocrat will do is to get a grip on them, and usually he succeeds.
Rule #4: Be outraged. In the face of the impulse to normalize, it is essential to maintain one’s capacity for shock. However, adherents of the autocrat or others who think that it will not be that bad will attack you, if you criticize the autocrat. Hasn’t he been elected democratically? Be prepared for such reactions.
Rule #5: Don’t make compromises. That’s just what the autocrat wants. Once you have compromised, new demands will follow. If you again give in a bit, again new demands will follow, etc., till finally you’ll be left with nothing and will have lost everything.
Rule #6: Remember the future. Nothing lasts forever. There is hope.

This blog is certainly not only about US president Trump, as it might seem, but about any new authoritarian leader. In Europe it applies to the Hungarian Prime Minster Victor Orbán, for instance, or to the Dutch political leader Geert Wilders, or the Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. Wilders and Meloni are still contained by the political systems in their countries, but will this remain so?
If you think all this is too vague to stop an autocrat, the American political scientist Gene Sharp (1928-2018) has conducted extensive research into the problem how to tackle repression in a nonviolent way, which resulted in a list of 198 methods (see also the main page of the website of the Albert Einstein Institute). Autocrats can be toppled by the will of the people, as history learns.

See also my
- “Non-violent resistance and repressive regimes” summary and full text
- “Nonviolence and power. A study about the importance of power relations for nonviolent action and resistance” summary and full text
- “Non-violent resistance and the properties of states. A preliminary study” summary and full text

Random quote
Never Throw Down Your Weapons.
When blind fold Hatred’s claws are shown:
And Falsehood swings come dark behind,
Stand to your arms, and lay not down:
The weapons of the Mind.

Alexander Graf von Hoyos (1876-1937)

Taking the perspective of the other

Sometimes it is helpful to view things from an unusual perspective.

What I often miss in the views of many politicians is a feeling how others, like their opponents (but not only their opponents), who are affected by their measures, judge these measures and the ideas behind them. Not few politicians think that what they do is superior and that others must adapt, and if they don’t that they must be punished. Only few politicians can place themselves in the shoes of their opponents and those affected by their decisions. They cannot take the perspective of the other, as it is called in psychology. It’s not that they must agree with these others, but having a feeling for their viewpoints, especially those viewpoints they don’t agree with, will make their decisions more sensible.
Taking the perspective of the other involves putting yourself in the position of the other and trying to imagine how this person sees the world from his perspective and especially how he sees you. It also involves understanding the feelings belonging to that position. So, if a small country is attacked by a big neighbour, and you want to mediate in the conflict, you must not only see it as a clash on a political chessboard that can be solved if both parties give in a bit, or take the stalemate on the battlefield as a starting point without taking the reasons and causes of the conflict into account. You need also take account of the different views of the warring parties. For instance, you as a mediator should understand that the big neighbour is a former superpower who wants to restore the position it once had and that it wants to “collect” a series of weak vassal states at its borders, while the small attacked country is desperately asking your support, in order to keep the freedom it acquired 30 years ago, when it became independent of the big neighbour that now tries to undo its liberty and independence.
Taking the perspective of the other makes that you get a better and multi-sided view on the problem at hand and on the consequences of the actions you want to perform. It helps avoid the mistake of seeing what others do only from your perspective, by thinking that your view on the world is the way everybody sees it. It makes you aware of what other people see and how they see it. So, it is not a matter of taking merely the place of another and look at the world from there with your ideas, but you must look around from that position with their ideas. In this way, you’ll not only have a better feeling for what others do and why, but you’ll also get more information, and you will be better able to interact with others. You’ll have a better understanding of those you interact with. As David W. Johnson writes in Psychology Today: “Once people can view the issue and situation both from their own perspective and the other persons’ perspectives, they can more easily find mutually beneficial solutions. Perspective-taking also communicates that one really understands their thoughts, feelings, and needs. It is usually easier to jointly solve a problem when the other people feel understood and respected.”
For politicians, taking the perspective of the other is not only a matter of the right attitude, but also a matter of being surrounded by the right persons, especially by the right advisors. By right advisors I don’t mean only advisors who basically agree with you but just also advisors that do not. It is important to have around you also advisors who are critical of your views and who can formulate alternative possibilities; possibilities you may not agree with initially. Such advisors help develop broad, multi-sided views. This is important since it helps make political decision makers aware 1) that everyone has a unique perspective; 2) that perspectives are dependent on a person’s experiences, expectations and goals; 3) that the same message can mean two entirely different things from two different perspectives; and 4) it helps avoid the misunderstanding that everybody sees things from the same perspective as you do, (see Psychology Today)
Generally, the effects of perspective taking are positive. 1) It improves communication and reduces misunderstandings and distortions. 2) It is essential for a realistic assessment of common and opposed interests and an accurate assessment of their validity and relative merits. Without a realistic view lasting agreements and solutions are hardly possible. 3) If you want to influence others, you need to have a feeling what they stand for and to feel the emotional force with which they believe in it. 4) Engaging in perspective-taking tends to improve the relationship with the other person. You are more liked and respected when the other sees that you know his perspective and takes it into consideration.
Some politicians do what you like and like what they do, without taking care what others and especially their opponents and victims think of it. At first, this egomania may be effective, but then those affected will look for countermeasures, or ways to ignore them and leave them alone. (see Psychology Today)

Random quote
How regrettable it is that many Great Man committed his almost superhuman acts like a dupe, like an insane one! With the initially perhaps noble inspiration, he gradually became a stormer and a robber chief.

Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803)

Johann Gottfried Herder, a forgotten philosopher

Some philosophers with a big impact on human thinking are almost forgotten. Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) is one of them. I guess that most of my readers will not have heard of this Prussian Enlightenment philosopher. Happily, I knew a little bit about him, so when I saw an anthology from his work with an introduction in a bookshop, I didn’t hesitate to buy it. For, although I knew his name and although I knew that he had been an important thinker, and that he had something to do with the idea of history, I had never read anything written by Herder. So, this was a good opportunity to correct that omission.
In short, and maybe a bit exaggerated, Herder’s contribution to human thinking has been threefold:
- He invented the idea of history.
- He invented the idea of cultural relativism.
- He stressed the importance of language as the bearer of our thinking and world views.
There is more, but already this made Herder one of the leading figures of the Enlightenment.
As for the last point, which I’ll further ignore, Herder was one of the first to state that language shapes our framework of thinking, without saying that it determines thinking. Languages are the reflections of cultures.
But let me go to the other points. Until the 18th century the European world views were static. In fact, there was no past and no future, but only present. I mean, people thought that past and future were more or less copies of the present. Only the variables were filled in differently during the ages. The persons changed and institutions may have been replaced by other institutions, but it was, so to speak, old wine in new bottles, so people thought. However, Herder made clear that history involved development. The present is not a repetition of the past, but the past is substantially different from the present. Human institutions and ideas are continuously changing and becoming qualitatively different. There is progress, or maybe decline, or at least there is change. New wines are being developed, so to speak; not only the bottles become new. After some time, old wines are no longer considered tasty.
Herder introduced also the idea of cultural relativism. This involves that each culture has a value of its own. Therefore, each culture must be measured by its own standards. There are no inferior or superior cultures. This was a direct attack on the reigning European culture and its self-arrogance towards non-European cultures: “Every nation must ... only be viewed from its own situation with everything it is and has. ... Our European culture cannot act as a measure of general human values.”
That this was something new, can be illustrated by mediaeval paintings. Mediaeval painters often painted biblical scenes, so scenes in the holy land or otherwise in Egypt, Babylonia, and the like. However, these depicted scenes were clearly Mediaeval-European. They didn’t take into account that the biblical stories took place thousands of years ago in a different, Middle-Eastern culture. Only by and after the Renaissance, people began to realize that there have been different worlds that were not only inhabited by different people, but that these worlds were fundamentally different from theirs. So biblical scenes had to be filled with Middle-Eastern landscapes and with people in Middle-Eastern cloths. Johann Gottfried Herder was the first or at least the most influential philosopher who worded and expressed such views.

Does this mean that we must accept everything that is happening in other cultures, because it is happening in a culture that is not our own? Supposing that we accept Herder’s ideas, the answer is yes and no. It is “yes”, because we cannot or must not apply our own standards to cultures that are alien to these standards. Cultures must be judged from within. But this makes that the answer is also “no”. Actually, in each culture there are dissidents and critics. No culture is a unity. Moreover, cultures don’t exist isolated, anyway not in the present world. Carriers of a culture look across the borders of their own worlds, and there are always also a few who physically leave their own world and travel around and get new ideas and see other standards. This can be a starting point for criticism and cultural change.
Does this mean that in the end all values, norms and standards are relative, since culture-bound? I think that the answer is clearly “no”. Although values, norms and standards are culture-bound, this doesn’t involve that they are bound only to one culture. Some values, norms and standards are general and apply to everybody. We call them universal human values. They have been formulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for instance. Thanks to the Enlightenment philosophers we know that general standards should be general and not be one-sided and culture-bound. Herder was one of these philosophers and certainly not the most unimportant one.

Sources: Johann Gottfried Herder, Hoe worden we humaan? (esp. pp. 106-124; quote on p. 118, my translation) and Wikipedia.

Random quote
Human feeling becomes indignant when brutal and brute trade measures are taken against innocent nations, purely for their own gain, so that such nations are actually sacrificed.

Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) 

Fact and fake

Abstract portrait of Ferdinand Domela Nieuwenhuis on a barn
somewhere in the North of the Netherlands

At the end of the First World War (1914-1918) there was a revolutionary mood in many European countries, also in countries that had been neutral in this war. I think that everybody knows about the Russian October Revolution, which actually took place in November 1917. It led to the establishment of the communist regime. In November 1918, uprisings broke out all over Germany. The result was the fall of the Empire and the establishment of the Weimar Republic. There were also revolutions and attempted revolutions in Hungary and Switzerland and other countries and, indeed, in the Netherlands (my own country) as well. Most Dutchmen will have heard of the failed bloodless coup by the Dutch social democratic leader Pieter Jelles Troelstra on 11 and 12 November, which actually was not more than a list of radical demands. Less known is the revolutionary atmosphere in Amsterdam on 13 November.
Although the Netherlands had nothing to do with the First World War and had stayed neutral, also this country had suffered a lot from the war because of a kind of blockade in disguise by the fighting countries, who tried to keep all food, industrial products etc. for themselves. The Netherlands was not only enclosed by the warring countries, but as a merchant country it was heavily dependent on the import of food and other products (including fertilizers) and it was unable to produce enough food for feeding its population. As a result, first food and other products had to be rationed and at the end of the war there was a beginning famine. Add to this the already existing poverty in rural and urban areas, and it was not surprising that there existed a pressure to change, if not to revolution. Under the influence of the events in Russia and Germany, also the Dutch leftist leaders made radical demands. On 12 November, the social democrats had brought them forward in meetings in Rotterdam and in the parliament in The Hague, and a day later also on a meeting in Amsterdam. On that 13th November, in the evening, communists, anarchists and other groups left of the social democrats organized a meeting elsewhere in Amsterdam. The great anarchistic leader Ferdinand Domela Nieuwenhuis was also there. He was the most popular radical leader in the Netherlands in those days. He had done much for improving the miserable situation of the poor, especially for the rural poor, and therefore he was called “The Saviour”.
During this meeting of the radicals, it was decided to hold a march through Amsterdam. The mood was rebellious, and many participants thought that the revolution had now started. The route of the march passed two army barracks. When the front of the march with the leaders had already passed the first army barracks peacefully, a group of demonstrators in the middle of the parade decided to enter its grounds and to seize the weapons. Or at least, it’s what the guard may have thought. What exactly happened is not clear, but anyway, soldiers opened fire on the invaders, four demonstrators died and several were wounded. After this tragic event, some left the demonstration, others continued the march but the revolution never took place.

What did Domela Nieuwenhuis during the march? 25 years later, one of the demonstrators wrote: “I can still see this memorable demonstration in my mind … Domela Nieuwenhuis in a carriage in front of the march …”
However, Jan Meyers, the biographer of Domela Nieuwenhuis, wrote in 1993 that Domela went in a carriage at the backside of the march.
Domela was an old man, who hardly could walk anymore, so, if he had participated in the march, probably he would have done so in a carriage. However, a policy spy who had been present at the meeting before the march started reported that he was brought home, after having given a speech at the meeting. So, the march took place without Domela.

What happened really that evening in Amsterdam and especially what did Domela Nieuwenhuis? Most likely, the version of the police spy is true. Half a year later Domela was present at another march, and there he was present in a carriage. So, both marches may have been confused. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to suppose that the demonstrator, the biographer and the police spy were in good faith, when they told what Domela did on 13 November. What we see here are three different representations of the same “fact” that might have been true. Such things often happen. Often it is afterwards difficult to determine what is true and what is false, especially when we have only witness statements that describe an event and no objective evidence. Fake and fact are often difficult to disentangle, especially when what is fake has not been intentionally constructed. And look at yourself: How often aren’t you wrong, though you think to tell the truth?

Source: Wouter Linmans, Revolutiekoorts. Onrust en oproer in november 1918. Esp. pp. 139-141. See also my blog Personal identity and memory.

Random quote
From the time when man stole the fire from heaven and learned to work the iron, since he forcibly brought the animals and his fellow brothers together and also used the vegetable kingdom for the benefit of himself, he has in many ways contributed to the change of the climate. … So we can also imagine the human race as a troop of confident, but little giants, who have come down from the mountains in order to subdue there the earth and to change the climate with their weak fists. The future will tell to what extent they will succeed.

Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803)

At the top

“…why, in giving your estimate of a man, do you prize him wrapped and muffled up in clothes…”

In his essay “Of the inequality amongst us” (Essays, Book I-42) Montaigne asks why we don’t judge humans by their own gifts. “We commend a horse for his strength and sureness of foot”, so Montaigne, “and not for his rich caparison; a greyhound for his speed of heels, not for his fine collar...” So why then don’t we just humans for their own qualities? Someone may have many servants, a beautiful house, much power, many thousand pounds a year: all these are about him, but not in him. If you buy a horse, you want to see him without a horse blanket; you want to see him naked and open to your eye. So, “why, in giving your estimate of a man, do you prize him wrapped and muffled up in clothes? He then discovers nothing to you but such parts as are not in the least his own, and conceals those by which alone one may rightly judge of his value. ‘Tis the price of the blade that you inquire into, not of the scabbard: you would perhaps not bid a farthing for him, if you saw him stripped.” … “Measure [a person] without his stilts; let him lay aside his revenues and his titles; let him present himself in his shirt. Then examine if his body be sound and sprightly, active and disposed to perform its functions. What soul has he? Is she beautiful, capable, and happily provided of all her faculties? Is she rich of what is her own, or of what she has borrowed? Has fortune no hand in the affair? … Is she settled, even and content? This is what is to be examined, and by that you are to judge of the vast differences betwixt man and man.” This is what counts, so Montaigne. Power and wealth are mere outer appearances. Nevertheless, we are blinded by them, and we ignore the actual person. That is foolishness: “If we consider a peasant and a king, a nobleman and a vassal, a magistrate and a private man, a rich man and a poor, there appears a vast disparity, though they differ no more, as a man may say, than in their breeches.”
You can argue that having power, money and possessions does have advantages. However, they don’t make those who have them better persons. Even more, those on the top are usually worse off than ordinary humans. If you see those on the top in private, “you will see nothing more than an ordinary man, perhaps more contemptible than the meanest of his subjects: … cowardice, irresolution, ambition, spite, and envy agitate him as much as another”. In other words, as Montaigne explains by quoting Seneca: Although an ordinary man has less wealth and power than someone at the top, “the one is happy in himself; the happiness of the other is counterfeit.”
Here we have come to the heart of this essay. Montaigne will certainly not deny that having some wealth is better than being poor. As a lord, he knew that having some wealth frees you from much misery and from the basic limitations of life. Indeed, he was a lord, but only a little one, though one with relations in the highest circles. And just because of those relations with the top, he knew how life there was. Despite all praise that the one at the top receives, Montaigne knew that “he is but a man at best, and if he be deformed or ill-qualified from his birth, the empire of the universe cannot set him to rights.” Wealth and power don’t make you a better person than you actually are. “What of all that, if he be a fool? Even pleasure and good fortune are not relished without vigour and understanding… Where the body and the mind are in disorder, to what use serve these external conveniences: considering that the least prick with a pin, or the least passion of the soul, is sufficient to deprive one of the pleasure of being sole monarch of the world… Assuredly, it can be no easy task to rule others, when we find it so hard a matter to govern ourselves... I am very much of opinion that it is far more easy and pleasant to follow than to lead; and that it is a great settlement and satisfaction of mind to have only one path to walk in, and to have none to answer for but a man’s self.”
Being at the top doesn’t make you happy, nor does being extremely wealthy and living in abundance. “Nothing is so distasteful and clogging as abundance,” Montaigne tells us. However, – what Montaigne also wants to tell us – the problem is that many at the top think it does. And those at the top do not only think that such a life is the best there is because they are at the top, but in addition they are surrounded by people who make them believe that life there is the best there is and that they themselves are the best. Moreover, they choose such people around them. No wonder then, that they think to fulfil a divine mission and that they deserve the Noble Prize for that. Here, too, Montaigne holds up a mirror to them. Like all rulers, also Alexander the Great, King of Macedon (356-323 BC) was surrounded by flatterers. They told him that he was the son of Jupiter. However, Montaigne tells us, one day Alexander was wounded, and seeing the blood streaming from his wound, he said: “What say you now, my masters, is not this blood of a crimson colour and purely human? This is not of the complexion of that which Homer makes to issue from the wounded gods.”
Let me end this blog in the same way as Montaigne ended his essay: Each person’s way of life shapes his own fortune.

Random quote
We live in a possessed world. And we know it. It would not be unexpected for anyone if the madness suddenly broke out in a frenzy that would leave our poor European humanity in numbness and foolishness, with the engines still spinning and the flags still fluttering, but the mind gone. 

Johan Huizinga (1872-1945) 

Narcissism

The nymph Echo spied Narcissus, who had been lost in a wood, and she became immediately infatuated, following him, waiting for him to speak so her feelings might be heard. Echo came close enough so that she was revealed, and attempted to embrace him. Horrified, he stepped back and told her to “keep her chains”. Heartbroken, Echo wasted away, losing her body and only her voice remained.
Nemesis, the goddess of revenge, heard the pleas of a young man, Ameinias, who had fallen for Narcissus but was ignored and cursed him. Nemesis listened, and proclaimed that Narcissus would never be able to be loved by the one he fell in love with.
After spurning Echo and Ameinias, Narcissus became thirsty and found a pool of water. Leaning down to drink, Narcissus sees his reflection. Not realizing it was his own reflection, Narcissus fell deeply in love with it. Thus Nemesis’ curse came true, for unable to leave the allure of this image, Narcissus eventually realized that his love could not be reciprocated. He melted away from the fire of passion burning inside him, eventually turning into a gold and white flower.
(From: Wikipedia (adapted))

-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-

Narcissus fell in love with himself, an impossible love. Psychologists used the myth and described narcissism as a grandiose sense of self-importance, a lack of empathy for others, a need for excessive admiration, and the belief that one is unique and deserving of special treatment. (source) Although at first, when you meet a narcissistic person, you may like him (a narcissist is more often a man than a woman), because he is charming and nice, over time you’ll feel ignored, uncared about, and unimportant, for a narcissist has at least five of the following characteristics:

1. A grandiose sense of self-importance, and exaggerating achievements and talents
2. Dreams of unlimited power, success, brilliance, beauty, or ideal love
3. Requires excessive admiration
4. Believes he is special and unique, and can only be understood by, or should associate with other special or high-status people or institutions
5. Lacks empathy for the feelings and needs of others
6. Unreasonably expects special, favourable treatment or compliance with his wishes
7. Exploits and takes advantage of others to achieve personal ends
8. Envies others or believes they’re envious of him
9. Has “an attitude” of arrogance or acts that way
(source; in fact from the DSM-5 mental disorders manual).

You may think that each person has narcissist traits to some degree, but the difference between a normal person and a narcissist is that the latter has these traits to an extreme degree and that it is hard to talk with him about it. Moreover, it’s always you, who must give in, if you meet a person with a narcissistic personality disorder (NPD). I found this accurate description of the difference between a normal person and a narcissist: “If you tell a ‘normal’ person they can’t come in, they may ask why but they will accept the boundary that’s been set. If you tell someone with NPD they can’t come in, they will try to break the door down. If you bolt the door, they will try the windows. If you board up and bolt the windows, they will try to make a hole in the roof. If that's an impossible route, they will burn the house down but they WILL get in because obsessively defeating the boundary you set becomes their objective, not the reason they wanted to come in.” (source)

Narcissism resembles hubris, as discussed in my last blog. Some see them as different positions on a personality scale. And it is so that Owen and Davidson listed narcissism among the symptoms of the hubris syndrome (see my last blog). Nevertheless, they are not the same. While hubris is a trait a person has acquired by his experiences, narcissism (NPD) is a disorder, so a kind of illness. Hubris is temporary, while narcissism is a personality characteristic and therefore difficult to change, if it is. It makes that the hubris syndrome appears in later life, while narcissism appears in late childhood or adolescence and it continues into adulthood. The hubris syndrome is an outcome of the environment acquired by persons in positions of power, and if it can be seen as an illness, it is “an illness of position as much as of the person.” (Owen) This doesn’t mean, of course, that hubristic persons cannot have a narcissistic disorder as well.
Can we do without persons with narcissistic traits? A study by Zoltán Fazekas and Peter K. Hatemi shows that “those scoring higher in narcissism … participate more in politics, including contacting politicians, signing petitions, joining demonstrations, donating money, and voting in midterm elections.” “The general picture is that individuals who believe in themselves, and believe that they are better than others, engage in the political process more,” so the researchers. “At the same time, those individuals who are more self-sufficient are also less likely to take part in the political process. This means that policies and electoral outcomes could increasingly be guided by those who both want more, but give less.” In an interview, Peter Hatemi says: “It is hard not to notice how much more of ‘me’ is part of our world – projecting one’s status at the cost of others, whether using social media such as Facebook or Instagram or Twitter. … It was hard for my colleague Zoltan Fazekas and I [sic] to ignore the rampant narcissism in our elected leaders, and the outcomes of their decisions. And it seemed likely that higher public narcissism has some role in the growing instability of our democracy. … A healthy democracy depends on a representative public that participates, but perhaps those who are participating are part of the problem? Some of the public has become more mobilized, but this mobilization is not evenly distributed. Arguably, people who participate more are more hardline and ideologically driven than any time in history, and it looks like narcissism has some role as well.” In a Me Era we can expect me-politicians, and that’s what we are seeing now.
I wanted to write about the difference between hubristic and narcissistic behaviour, but in the present political practice it makes little difference whether we are victims of the former or the latter.

Random quote
Famous quote but today more than ever true:
‘Tis to much purpose to go upon stilts, for, when upon stilts, we must yet walk with our legs; and when seated upon the most elevated throne in the world, we are but seated upon our breech.

Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592)

The hubris syndrome

The Greek goddess Nemesis in the interpretation of Albrecht Dürer

Two weeks ago, I analysed hubris as a kind of once-occurring, at least not systematically arrogant and intemperate behaviour. However, it can also happen that someone shows regularly or even systematically this undesirable behaviour. Then hubris has become a personality trait and the person concerned suffers from the hubris syndrome.
The hubris syndrome is mainly found in persons who hold positions of power. Just this makes it dangerous, not only for the persons in the immediate environment of the hubristic person. If a person is a top politician or a CEO, hubristic behaviour can have far-reaching consequences for sectors of society, if not for society as a whole and the whole world, as Lord David Owen has shown in his book The Hubris Syndrome. As Owen says there (p. xiii): “The havoc which hubristic heads of government can wreak is usually suffered by the people in whose name they govern.” And although in the beginning hubristic persons may win glory and acclamation because of their successes, in the end they meet their nemesis, like in a Greek tragedy.
What does the hubris syndrome involve? Lord Owen and Jonathan Davidson, who together coined the term hubris syndrome, present in their article “Hubris syndrome…” a list of 14 symptoms of the syndrome (see also here):

1. A narcissistic propensity to see their world primarily as an arena in which to exercise power and seek glory.
2. A predisposition to take actions which seem likely to cast the individual in a good light – i.e. in order to enhance image.
3. A disproportionate concern with image and presentation.
4. A messianic manner of talking about current activities and a tendency to exaltation.
5. An identification with the nation, or organization to the extent that the individual regards his/her outlook and interests as identical.
6. A tendency to speak in the third person or use the royal “we”.
7. Excessive confidence in the individual’s own judgement and contempt for the advice or criticism of others.
8. Exaggerated self-belief, bordering on a sense of omnipotence, in what they personally can achieve.
9. A belief that rather than being accountable to the mundane court of colleagues or public opinion, the court to which they answer is: History or God.
10. An unshakable belief that in that court they will be vindicated.
11. Loss of contact with reality; often associated with progressive isolation.
12. Restlessness, recklessness and impulsiveness.
13. A tendency to allow their “broad vision”, about the moral rectitude of a proposed course, to obviate the need to consider practicality, cost or outcomes.
14. Hubristic incompetence, where things go wrong because too much self-confidence has led the leader not to worry about the nuts and bolts of policy.

It is not so that a person suffering from the hubris syndrome should have all these symptoms. Three or four are enough, so Owen , to contemplate such a diagnosis. Moreover, the hubris syndrome is better seen as an acquired personality trait rather than as an acquired personality disorder. (see here) In addition, as Owen says in his book (p. 3) and articles: “Most syndromes of personality tend to manifest themselves in people by the age of eighteen and stay with them for the rest of their lives. Hubristic syndrome is different in that it should not be seen as a personality syndrome but as something which manifests itself in leaders only when in power – and usually only after they have been wielding it for some time – and which then may well abate once power is lost. In that sense it is an illness of position as much as of the person.” Usually, the syndrome comes gradually and gradually it fades away after the person has lost his position, for it often depends on the circumstances a person is in; on external factors. Owen mentions especially three key factors: Holding substantial power, minimal constraint on the leader exercising such personal authority, and the length of time they stay in power.

The hubris syndrome is not an innocent trait. It has many negative effects. A leader who thinks to be the greatest can cause many problems. To mention a few (see here):
- Lack of trust: The inability to see their own mistakes, shortcomings and incompetence undermines the confidence of those who should assist and support the leader.
- Weak relationships: People avoid solid bonds with arrogant and self-indulgent persons and those whom they don’t trust.
- Irrational decision-making: Leaders who don’t accept criticism make decisions without valuable insights and input from other people and are often perceived as impulsive and reckless.
- Leaders who don’t admit mistakes and don’t accept criticism tend to have ineffective teams that must support them.

Once a leader has become hubristic, it is difficult to change their behaviour, for hubristic leaders tend to surround themselves with assistants who agree with them already in advance and who confirm their decisions and behaviour and do not criticize them. However, when you get a leadership position there are a few things you can do to prevent that you become hubristic (ibid.):
- Ask for feedback regularly.
- Try to understand what kind of person you are.
- Get your hands dirty, so do some grunt work yourself.

But alas, it’s a feature of hubristic personalities that they are not open to such preventive and corrective measures. In a Greek drama, hubris always leads to the fall of the hubristic person. Hubris is punished by Nemesis. In the real world, often it is not different. But before that happens, a lot of damage has already been done.

---

P.S. Should I mention names? Most authoritarian political leaders in the present world are hubristic persons. Trump and Putin in the first place. However, once you know the characteristics, you will no doubt also recognize hubristic persons in your immediate environment.

Random quote
Arrogance of power [is] a psychological need that nations seem to have in order to prove that they are bigger, better, or stronger than other nations.

J. William Fulbright (1905-1995), former chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

Hubris

The Fall of Icarus (Lantern console, Utrecht, NL)

In my last blog, I described how Idomeneo, King of Crete, opposed the will of a god and the forces of the cosmic order in order to save his son’s life. I explained that Idomeneo’s behaviour exemplifies the behaviour of the present world leaders, especially the older ones, who, like Idomeneo, ignore the obligations imposed on them by the human and cosmic order. After having written this blog, I realized that the ancient Greeks had a word for such behaviour: Hubris (also hybris; Greek: ὕβρις). It was one of the biggest crimes that a Greek citizen could commit. In Athens, you could be severely punished for it. But what actually is hubris?
At school, I learned that it had to be translated as overconfidence or haughtiness. However, I was told that it was a complex, much wider concept. And indeed, it is. Not only has hubris a much wider meaning than just overconfidence or haughtiness, but it’s meaning changed also through the ages. “In ancient times”, so Britannica, it meant “the intentional use of violence to humiliate or degrade. The word’s connotation changed over time, and hubris came to be defined as overweening presumption that leads a person to disregard the divinely fixed limits on human action in an ordered cosmos.” (my italics)
Hubris was often seen as extremely arrogant behaviour towards other persons, for example by Aristotle in his Rhetorics 1378b. However, I think that disregarding the cosmic order is at least so important as the personal aspect, if not the most important aspect, of hubris. But the personal aspect doesn’t need to exclude the cosmic aspect. Actually, the former is a manifestation of the latter, and that’s why it was considered a crime. Indeed, “some poets—especially Hesiod (7th century BCE) and Aeschylus (5th century BCE)—used hubris to describe wrongful action against the divine order”, so Britannica.
However, as Sjoerd van Hoorn explains, hubris isn’t only a violation of the divine or cosmic order as such, it is also a psychic attitude. For Pindar and Theognis (Greek poets, 6th century BCE) hybrid was a psychic concept. “Hybris is … an excess of confidence or too great a happiness that does not suit a person … A human who possesses practical wisdom is one who keeps measure, while immoderation can end in crime on the one hand, but on the other hand it can amount to what we still refer to in Dutch as ‘request the gods’ [= tempting fate], act in such a way that you ask for problems, as it were”, so van Hoorn (my italics)

Above I have explained that hubris is a complex, wide concept that, through the ages, had different meanings for the ancient Greeks, or at least different connotations. Nevertheless, I think that we can say that the concept of hubris has the following characteristics:
- Arrogant behaviour and contempt for the other, accompanied by humiliation, insolence, and the like.
- Violation of the human, divine and cosmic order; if not disrespect for this order. Instead of divine and cosmic order, most of us today would say the natural order. The human order includes the legal order.
- Immoderation, intemperateness if not excessiveness.
Hubris is an old Greek word. If you would ask me for a modern word or expression that covers its meaning best, I think that disrespect is a good choice; or even better, disrespect based on a sense of superiority. To my mind just this idea excellently sums up the behaviour of the leaders of the major world powers and of the people around them. It’s not difficult to fill in names. They all try to strengthen their positions and to glorify themselves at the cost of others by disrespecting and taunting these others and by discrediting their integrity. In doing so they go against the cosmic order that forces us to take care of problems like climate change, war, poverty, depleting human resources, etc. In Athens hubris was a severe crime. In Greek mythology and in Greek dramas hubris was always punished, as it was in Mozart’s opera Idomeneo, too. Why would it now be different? Hubris goes before a fall.