In his article “Free will as a social institution”,
Wolfgang Prinz defends the thesis of dual representation of reality. On the one
hand, the thesis says, we have a direct representation of what is going on and
what is present around us in the world (we can say that we have an “image” of
it, if we take this notion not too literally). This representation exists on an
unconscious level, which I want to call “level 1”. This level-1-representation is
the basis of our doings. On a conscious level we can experience this level-1-representation
and have a conscious representation of it. I’ll call this conscious
representation a representation on level 0. The function of this level-0-representation
is, in terms of Prinz, to “decouple the individual from the current actual
situation” and to develop thoughts about what is going on and on what one is
doing. However, as Prinz says it, “the decoupling cannot be complete, since the
normal perception of the current surrounding situation has to continue to
function”, and, as I want to add, one is also in a constant need to act. Despite
this constant need to act and the ongoing current of experiences a person is
confronted with, the “decoupled” conscious level-0-representation has an
important function: It allows us to evaluate what is happening around us and
what we are doing in reaction to it on level 1. It allows us to interpret the
“world” and our actions and, most important, to reflect on what we are doing,
to stop what we are doing mechanically, to decide what to do instead, and so
on. In short, our conscious part functions as a pilot on a plane that as a rule
flies automatically.
Prinz uses this dual representation model (based on
theories by Dennett, Metzinger, Edelman and others) for explaining what
actually the free will is. I want to link it to two other issues.
For one thing, when I read the article for the first
time, I linked the dual representation conception to Descartes’ mind-body
dualism, but not in the sense that it substantiates his idea but just that it
makes clear what Descartes did wrong. For Descartes distinguished two
substances, namely matter – which shapes the machine that the body is in his
view – and mind – which shapes the self
–. According to him both are fundamentally independent of each other, although
the mind – “self” – can steer the body via the pineal gland. Also Prinz says
that the level 0 functions of man can be seen as man’s self. However, his dual
representation model shows that this self – “mind” – and body are functional
parts of the same physical machine that we call “man”.
Secondly, when I reread Prinz’s article and started to
write this blog, I suddenly realized that the dual representation model is
nothing but a neuropsychological foundation of my version of the dual aspect
theory of knowledge, which now appears to be nothing but an epistemological explanation
of the mind-body problem, as developed by me in my PhD thesis twenty years ago
(and summarized in an article; see the sources below). I have referred to this
theory also in older blogs and now readers of these blogs will understand why I
preferred to call this conscious level “level 0” instead of “level 2”. In the
present blog I cannot discuss this theory, but the essence is this: Following
Habermas, I distinguished two levels in the way we interpret reality: level 1
and level 0. Level 1 is
the level all sciences
are faced with when they theoretically interpret their objects of research. Level
0 is typical of those sciences, like the social sciences, that deal with
objects that have been given meaning by the investigated people themselves. Accordingly
we can distinguish two kinds of meaning: meaning 1 and meaning 0.
The former is the kind of meaning used on level 1. It is the meaning a
scientist gives to an object, either physical or social in character, and it is
the scientist’s theoretical interpretation of reality. Meaning 0 is the concept
of meaning for the underlying level 0. It is the meaning people who make up
social reality give to this social reality or to parts of it themselves;
it is their interpretation of their own lived reality.
And now, twenty years later, we see that my version of
the dual aspect theory is not just a methodological idea, but that it can be
also sustained with the help of recent developments in neuropsychology.
Sources: Wolfgang Prinz, “Free will as a social
institution”, in Susan Pockett et al. Does
consciousness cause behavior?, MIT Press, 2006; pp. 257-276 (esp. pp.
272-3).
Henk bij de Weg, “The commonsense conception and
its relation to philosophy”, Philosophical Explorations, 2001/1, pp.
17-30.