Random quote
The most common mistake people make is to have got part of the truth and to think they’ve got all of it

Jonathan Wolff (1959-)

Polarisation

Who we are and what we do depends a lot on the people in our social environment; especially on those we directly interact with in one way or another. We see some we interact with as “us” and the rest as “the others”, and we behave accordingly, even to that extent that we may come to see “the others” as enemies; and sometimes even to that extent that we behave violently towards “the others”. It’s a well-established fact from social psychology. To see how it works, the Turkish-American social psychologist Muzafer Sherif and his colleagues performed in 1954 the so-called Robbers Cave Experiment. In this experiment, two groups of eleven 11 years old boys took part in a summer camp in Robbers Cave State Park in Oklahoma, USA. The boys in each group didn’t know about the other group. During the first part of the experiment the boys

“spent time with members of their own group... The groups chose names (the Eagles and the Rattlers), and each group developed their own group norms and group hierarchies. After a short period of time, the boys became aware that there was another group at camp and, upon learning of the other group, the campers group spoke negatively about the other group. At this point, the researchers began the next phase of the study: a competitive tournament between the groups, consisting of games such as baseball and tug-of-war, for which the winners would receive prizes and a trophy. [From now on] the relationship between the two groups quickly became tense. The groups began trading insults, and the conflict quickly spiraled. The teams each burned the other group’s team flag, and raided the other group’s cabin. The researchers also found that the group hostilities were apparent on surveys distributed to the campers: campers were asked to rate their own team and the other team on positive and negative traits, and the campers rated their own group more positively than the rival group. During this time, the researchers also noticed a change within the groups as well: the groups became more cohesive.” (quoted from the ThoughtCo website)

Before I’ll describe how the experiment ended, I want to look at what is happening around us in many countries in the world and especially in the Western world, but not only there. It was important for the experiment, that there were no fundamental differences between the Eagles and the Rattlers. The researchers had composed the groups (the background characteristics of the boys) as equal as possible, and the boys didn’t know each other before the camp started. So it was not this that the group rivalry could explain. Nevertheless, once they knew about the existence of each other, they began to see each other as rivals if not enemies. Just this makes the Robbers Camp Experiment interesting and important for understanding the growing polarisation in many countries, like the USA, the Netherlands, France, etc. For are the differences between the poles – let’s call them R and L for short – really that large that it is obvious that the present societies become polarized? Is there a real basis for the polarisation in the countries concerned and is the R-L split a reflection of real differences? Although I don’t want to deny that such differences exist, I think that the basic ground for the growing polarization is different, namely a sharp decrease in the number of contacts between different groups, views, ways of life, etc. in society. Nowadays. people interact with, deal with and get along with other people who are different from themselves less frequently than they did in the past. People interact less with people who are unlike themselves, have different views and opinions, have different lifestyles, are younger or older, etc. It is not that we should adopt the opinions, lifestyles, etc. from the people we meet, but by meeting others who are unlike “us”, we see that they are in many respects like “us”; they are as human as we are. In such a situation, if we disagree with “the others”, we are more prepared to try to make a deal with them, to find a consensus and to find common solutions, in case of conflict. However, nowadays it’s just the opposite that happens: People tend to limit their contacts more and more to their own bubbles. What happens then is shown by the Robbers Cave Experiment: Limited to your own bubble, more and more you tend to think: We are right and they are wrong. You tend to see those in other bubbles as rivals and enemies, with the use of violence against those you don’t agree with as the ultimate consequence. Society becomes polarized and once there this polarization increases itself.
But let me tell now how the Robbers Camp Experiment ended. I quote again from the ThoughtCo website:

To reduce the group conflict, the researchers “tried having the two groups work on what psychologists call superordinate goals, goals that both groups cared about, which they had to work together to achieve. For example, the camp’s water supply was cut off …, and the Eagles and Rattlers worked together to fix the problem. In another instance, a truck bringing the campers food wouldn’t start (again, an incident staged by the researchers), so members of both groups pulled on a rope to pull the broken truck. These activities didn’t immediately repair the relationship between the groups …, but working on shared goals eventually reduced conflict. The groups stopped calling each other names, perceptions of the other group (as measured by the researchers’ surveys) improved, and friendships even began to form with members of the other group. By the end of camp, some of the campers requested that everyone (from both groups) take the bus home together, and one group bought beverages for the other group on the ride home.”

So, once there, polarization can be reduced: Create common goals. Moreover, I think that as important as common goals – which creates an external enemy, and I wonder whether that is a good idea – are the interpersonal contacts that common goals involve. Since the present polarization in society is largely the consequence of the decrease of interactions between people with different backgrounds, I think that it is very important to restore such contacts again. Try to demolish interpersonal barriers between people and even more between groups of people. Make that people of different backgrounds come into contact with each other again. Institutionalize that people talk with each other; and then better in a café than in an official meeting. Mix them!

Random quote
Given that non-binding agreements have always failed to slow greenhouse gas emissions sufficiently in the past, is it rational to expect them to suddenly start doing so in the future? If the parties at an intergovernmental conference proclaim, ‘This time it’s different’, aren’t we right to disbelieve them?

Julian Baggini (1968-)

Ten reasons why the global warming will not be stopped

A catastrophe is happening on this earth: the global warming. Experts and international organisations agree that it must be stopped; anyway that a 1.5 degree global warming is the maximum acceptable; okay, let’s say 2 degrees, for a recent report says that in the period from February 2023 to January 2024 the global warming was already 1.52C compared with the preindustrial era. [1] In the meantime many measures have already been taken to combat the global warming. But will humanity succeed or can it keep the temperature rise within the 2% limit? Here are ten reasons why the answer is NO.

- Planners and politicians tend to overestimate their skills and capabilities, leading to an underestimation of the time and costs needed for the projects concerned. So, the measures and plans proposed are often too optimistic or not realistic.
- Pressure to present too optimistic plans. Environmental groups put pressure on governments to take action. That’s okay, but the result is that the targets set are often not realistic and accordingly the plans and measures aren’t. This provokes resistance from groups hit by the measures, which makes the implementation of the plans is delayed.
- The effects of the global warming become increasingly clear but often they are still vague (they might have happened by chance; happen gradually, etc.) and casual (they hit some people more than others and also some people hardly or not). Moreover, there is no clear end date in the sense that at date X the world will collapse and come to an end because of the warming. This leads to, what I want to call, the “procrastination effect”: too many people (governments, international organisations but also individuals) tend to postpone measures that are necessary.
- Conflicting interests. A part of the measures against the global warming must be taken at world level, but, for example, oil producing countries will try to slow down the implementation, because they’ll lose a part of their income, while countries that are dependent on oil import have a reason for a quick implementation.
- The rich countries, which contribute much to the global warming, should have to give up their rich lifestyle and privileges, which they don’t want to do. At most, they want to stay at the level they have reached. In the first place, within the rich countries the richest people should give up their lifestyle and privileges, since they contribute by far above average to the global warming compared with the less rich people in the rich countries, but as yet there is no sign that this will happen.
- The poor countries, which contribute by far below average to the global warming, will not give up their plans for improving the standard of living of the poorest people in their already poor countries. With right, but the implementation of these plans will contribute to the global warming.
- Corruption. Although leaders of corrupt countries pay lip service to the need to stop the global warming, they put (at least) a part of the money needed for the implementation of the plans to stop it in their own pockets and spend the money on expenses for their own rich lifestyle which just contributes to the global warming.
- Viscosity. National political measures and measures by international organisations are rarely a matter of “this must be done so we’ll immediately carry them out”. Many people must be consulted. Conflicting interests must be reconciled. Those who are hit negatively must be compensated. Decision procedures take time. Etc. So, it’s a long way from what must be done to the realization of a plan.
- Nobody can force individual countries to fulfil targets set during international conferences. The leaders of individual countries may say “yes” and think “no”. Or there are all kinds of reasons that they cannot or are not prepared to make (realistic) national plans that have been agreed upon internationally.
- Possible risks and uncertainties. Once measures against the global warming have been taken, often they don’t work the way that was expected. This can have both technical causes and human causes. You cannot foresee everything, there are many physical and natural uncertainties and humans react always in a different manner than planners and politicians think. Reality is simply too complicated for human beings.

Without a doubt there are many other factors that will make it very difficult if not impossible to stop the global warming. I just listed ten reasons that came to my mind. The factors mentioned are mainly sociological and political, but I should have added psychological factors as well. But the message is clear: The current approach will not stop the global warming. Maybe we must prepare ourselves for the posthuman era (but of course this is a contradiction, for where there are no humans there is nothing to prepare for humans).

Source
Most of my argument is based on older blogs. 

Random quote
A clever person with bad motives is dangerous, as they can generate persuasive arguments to serve their interests rather than truth.

Julian Baggini (1968-)

Equivocation

When I was writing my blog about types of fallacies last week, I realized that I had given hardly any attention to fallacies of ambiguity, while I regularly explained fallacies of presumption and relevance. This is not surprising for in Arp et al. 2019, 43 fallacies of presumption and 34 fallacies of relevance are discussed but only 16 fallacies of ambiguity. If this is a measure, then the latter are by far in the minority, which doesn’t involve, however, that they are less frequent. The only fallacy of ambiguity I discussed is the conjunction fallacy, while I mentioned the sorites fallacy only in passing. So, a good reason to treat such a fallacy now.
I think – though it is just a guess – that one of the most common fallacies of this type is the fallacy of equivocation. It often appears in discussions and political speeches. This fallacy involves that a word or phrase is used with different meanings in an argumentation. You may think: Of course, that’s a matter of false reasoning. However, the distinctions between the different meanings are often subtle and you may not see them or you must be a logical expert, and maybe also the speaker didn’t notice the mistake. Here is a clear case: “The loss made Jones mad [= angry]; mad [= insane] people should be institutionalized; so Jones should be institutionalized.”) [1] “Mad” has two different meanings here, so the conclusion doesn’t follow. Here is another rather simple example of this type: Only man [human] is rational, and no woman is a man [male]. Therefore, no woman is rational. [2]
However, an equivocation can be rather subtle, as said. Bertha Alvarez Manninen starts her explanation of the fallacy in Arp et al 2019 with an equivocation by Pres. John F. Kennedy, who said: “And so my fellow Americans, ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country.” The equivocation is here, so Manninen, that first “country” refers to the elected officials and then to something like your homeland, nation, or your fellow citizens.
The equivocation is even more subtle in a case analysed by the philosopher Mary Anne Warren and discussed by Manninen: I quote (pp. 262=3:

“Typically, a common pro-life argument runs as follows:

(1) All human beings have a right to life.
(2) A fetus is a human being.
(3) Therefore, the fetus has a right to life.

Warren … argues that an equivocation is made here with the term ‘human being’. In the first premise, [it] is a moral term, denoting the kinds of beings who are ‘a full-fledged member of the moral community.’… In the second premise, [it] is a biological term, denoting a member of the species Homo Sapiens. … A useful tool for determining whether an argument commits the fallacy of equivocation can be applied here: replace the premises of the argument explicitly with the term having the same meaning and then gauge whether the argument is successful.

(1) All human beings (in the moral sense) have a right to life.
(2) A fetus is a human being (in the moral sense).
(3) Therefore, the fetus has a right to life.

Seen this way, Warren argues that the pro-life argument commits the begging of the question fallacy in Premise 2 by assuming the very thing that needs to be argued [, namely] whether the fetus is a human being in the moral sense of the term... That is not to say that the fetus isn’t such a being but rather that this is the very thing that need to be argued rather than assumed.”

So far the quotation. Of course, alternatively one can add “(in the genetic sense)” in the premises instead of “(in the moral sense)”, etc. What this example makes clear is that discovering an equivocation often is hard, but it is necessary in order to get a meaningful debate. Its obscurity makes it an easy instrument of manipulation for politicians and orators by using ambiguous words or by using words in an ambiguous way.
However, you don’t need to be a politician, orator or a simple member of their public to commit the fallacy of equivocation. Also philosophers do, although they are supposedly experts in argumentation. Then we call it a category mistake. So, Heraclitus committed the fallacy of equivocation, or made a category mistake, when he said that you cannot step twice in the same river. By saying so, he confused the river and the water in the river. Another example is to confuse the mind and the brain. It is not our brain that thinks but our mind does. Also Descartes committed this fallacy, when he saw the mind sometimes as a thing and sometimes as a mental capacity.

Sources
- The numbers in brackets [ ] refer to the sources: Follow the links.
- Robert Arp; Steven Barbone; Michael Bruce (eds.), Bad arguments. 100 of the most important fallacies in Western philosophy. Oxford, etc.: Wiley Blackwell, 2019. Esp. Bertha Alvarez Manninen, “Equivocation”, pp. 261-5.

Random quote
The most dangerous liars are always those who believe they are telling the truth.

Thomas Metzinger (1958-)

Types of fallacies

In these blogs, now and then I write about fallacies. I think that this is important since the way we think has a big impact on the way we behave; on our private behaviour and our public behaviour. Therefore, it is better to avoid mistakes. As for public behaviour, one can think of political decisions and juridical verdicts, for instance. Especially, mistakes in juridical decisions can have dramatic consequences; for example, that an innocent suspect is sentenced to long prison terms, if not to the death penalty. Political decisions can lead to war or peace, so the reasoning that leads to such decisions must be sound. As for private behaviour, reasoning errors can have an impact on private life, such as wrong or too expensive purchases or voting for a president who doesn’t represent your interests, although you thought so. This time, I don’t want to discuss a special fallacy, but I want to give some background information.
Basically, there are two types of fallacies: Formal fallacies and informal fallacies. Both types of fallacies are based on incorrect deductive reasoning, but the difference is that in a formal fallacy, the conclusion doesn’t follow from the premises, because the structure or form of the reasoning is not correct, while in an informal fallacy the conclusion doesn’t follow from the premises because of the content of the argumentation. An important example of a formal fallacy we often come across in daily life is the “post hoc ergo propter hoc” fallacy (“post hoc ergo propter hoc” literally means “after this, so because of this”). An example: “If it has rained, the street is wet. This morning, when I woke up, the street was wet, so it has rained tonight.” This need not be true, for maybe a leaking tank lorry has passed. See this and this blog for more examples.
Although formal fallacies often happen in daily life, I think that informal fallacies are more frequent, especially in political discussions and other public discussions. Basically, there are three types of informal fallacies:
- Fallacy of presumption. It occurs, so Arp et.al (p. 22), “when an argument rests on some hidden assumption – it could be an unknown factor, a condition, set of circumstances, state of affairs, or idea – that, if not hidden, would make it clear that the assumption is not sufficient to be able to reason to (draw, infer) the conclusion.” The conjunction fallacy, discussed in one of my blogs (see link), is a case in point.
- Fallacy of relevance. It occurs, so Arp et.al (p. 25), when the premise or premises are irrelevant to the conclusion, even though they may appear so, because of an appeal to psychological or emotional relevance. Best known is the ad hominem fallacy (“playing the man instead of the ball”), discussed by me, for example, here and here. Also the “red herring” and “straw man” are fallacies of relevance.
- Fallacy of ambiguity. A fallacy of this type, so Arp et al. (p. 26), relies on some ambiguity (vagueness, obscurity, non-clarity) in wording or phrasing, the meanings of which shift/change to various degrees of subtlety during the course of the argument. The Sorites paradox is a case in point (“Take away again and again a grain of sand from a pile of sand; when is it no longer a pile?”) (see, for example, this blog). How often doesn’t it happen that the meaning of a word shifts during a discussion, or that it is so vague that you can use it for “any” conclusion by way of speaking?
This is how we often reason or how we try to convince others. But when we are doing so, we are on the wrong track.

Source
This blog is mainly based on the Introduction to Robert Arp; Steven Barbone; Michael Bruce (eds.), Bad arguments. 100 of the most important fallacies in Western philosophy. Oxford, etc.: Wiley Blackwell, 2019. 

Random quote
Groups and individuals with weak positions in society are faced with weak enforcement of their rights, while at the same time with strong enforcement of their duties. Conversely, groups with strong positions in society are well able to combine strict enforcement of their rights with weak enforcement of their duties.

Kees Schuyt (1943-)