Even Homer sometimes nods
Bertrand Russell was a great philosopher, who made
valuable contributions to philosophy. He was also a very creative philosopher.
His view was wider than the mathematical and analytic philosophy, which were
his specialities and which he helped develop. As for this we must also mention
that he stimulated Wittgenstein, who had approached him. Russell was
politically very active (which brought him in prison because of his opposition
to the First World War). He popularized philosophy. And so on. It was not
without reason that he got the Nobel Prize in Literature for his work. He
contributed to the advancement of philosophical thinking and thinking in
general. It will be clear that I cannot do justice to his work in a blog.
Russell also made mistakes, also philosophically, and
in many respects his philosophical ideas have been superseded. Here I want to
discuss such a mistake.
Let me take again Russell’s book The problems of philosophy, which I discussed in my last blog. In
this book he defends the view that “all our knowledge of truths depends upon
our intuitive knowledge” (ch. 10). I’ll not go into details, but Russell says
that some of our self-evident (intuitive) truths immediately derive from
sensation. “We call such truths ‘truths of perception’”, he says. According to
Russell these self-evident truths of perception – or perceptive intuitions, as
I’ll also call them – can be of two kinds: either they can assert the existence
of a sense-datum in an unanalyzed way or they can be judgments of memory (ch.
11). And just here we have a problem. Particularly the idea of sense-data has
been the object of much debate and in the end it appeared untenable, especially
after its rejection by Karl R. Popper, who put forward strong arguments against
the idea. Sense-data, so Russell, is the name for “the things that are
immediately known in sensation: such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses,
roughnesses, and so on.” (ch. 1) Now the idea that sense-data exist is seen as
naive, although many great philosophers thought so. “[I]f we are to know
anything about [a] table”, so Russell, “it must be by the means of the
sense-data – brown colour, oblong shape, smoothness, etc. – which we associate
with the table” (ch. 1). However, one can object that colour, shape, structure (like
smoothness), and other properties not mentioned by Russell like material (the
wood the table is made of) are not data objectively given in nature. These
properties are shaped in the mind. For example, physically colour does not
exist. There are only waves with a certain length, which are interpreted by us as red, blue, brown, etc. It is
the same for all other properties that Russell ascribes to sense-date. That we
see a table in a certain way is an interpretation of the mind. It’s not a kind
of objective fact like a sense-datum in the sense of Russell.
Take now the other kind of perceptive intuition: judgments
of memory. It’s true that Russell admits that we often make mistakes in what we
remember. Therefore he thinks that intuitive truth of memory is gradual. There
is a transition from what we certainly and self-evidently know to what we are
uncertain about whether we remember it to clear mistakes in memory (cf chs. 11 and 13). Nevertheless there
are absolute self-evident truths of this kind, so Russell. Memories and other
mental facts can be self-evidently true if they refer to private facts that are
finally unknown to others and can be known only by the one who has them. Let me
quote Russell for an example: “When Othello believes that Desdemona loves
Cassio, the corresponding fact, if his belief were true, would be ‘Desdemona’s
love for Cassio’. This would be a fact with which no one could have
acquaintance except Desdemona; hence in the sense of self-evidence that we are
considering, the truth that Desdemona loves Cassio (if it were a truth) could
only be self-evident to Desdemona. All mental facts, and all facts concerning
sense-data have this same privacy: there is only one person to whom they can be
self-evident in our present sense, since there is only one person who can be
acquainted with the mental things or sense-data concerned.” It is as if
Desdemona has a list with characteristics of being in love that she checks and
then says: “Indeed, I’m in love with Cassio”. No, it doesn’t work that way. For Desdemona there is no fact of “Desdemona’s love for Cassio”
that can be self-evident to her.
Russell confuses here the third-person perspective of Othello and the
first-person perspective of Desdemona. She simply is in love with Cassio, without thinking.
There is a saying that even Homer sometimes nods. We
use it when even the most gifted person makes mistakes. Despite his flaws Homer
was a great poet. Accordingly Russell was an excellent and brilliant
philosopher, even though we don’t always agree with him.
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