The tripartite distinction between doing, allowing and
enabling harm, which I discussed in my last blog, can put many philosophical
and daily problems in another light, for example the well-known trolley
problem. Although the trolley problem is often discussed as a pure
philosophical problem, there are many practical versions, like those treated by
Dostoevsky and Sartre. Here I’ll focus on a philosophical version of the case,
called Bystander: A
driverless, runaway trolley on a railway is heading for a tunnel, in which it will
kill five people, if nothing stops it. A bystander can save their lives by
turning a switch and redirecting the trolley on to another track. However,
there is a man walking on that track that will then be killed instead of the
five.
There are also other versions of the philosophical
trolley problem, for example that there is a driver on the trolley who can turn
the switch; that a bystander can stop the trolley by pushing a fat man on the
track; etc. But this simple version will do in order to show my point.
Judith Jarvis Thomson discusses the following principle
that can guide the decision whether or not to turn the switch: “Though (1)
killing five is worse than killing one, (2) killing one is worse than letting
five die”.
The principle seems reasonable and moreover it is typical
for the debate on the trolley problem, where actually every participant agrees
that:
(I) the bipartite distinction between doing and
allowing harm applies;
(II) turning the switch so that the single walker dies
is an act of killing that the bystander does.
I start with assumption II. I have my doubts that
turning the switch so that the single walker dies is an act of killing. Of
course, it is so that the single walker is killed, if the bystander turns the
switch, and it is also the case that killing is a matter of degree, ranging
from killing by accident to outright murder. Nevertheless, if we say that the
bystander kills the single walker by turning the switch, to me it sounds
somewhat odd. It is as if the bystander has the intention to kill the single
walker in order to save the five. However, the bystander doesn’t have this
intention at all. He merely wants to save the five people. If he could save the
single walker as well, he would be very happy. Moreover it is not the bystander
who kills the single walker but it is the trolley that does. I think that there
is more to say for it that the person who made that the trolley started moving
or could move in the direction of the switch is responsible for the killing of
either the five or of the single walker. If someone would be punished for the
death of one or five persons respectively, it would be him.
Be that as it may, let me examine what the bystander
does. The bystander has the intention to save the lives of the five persons on
the track. The bystander thinks that he can save these five lives only by
turning the switch. Therefore he turns the switch and the five persons are
saved. However, the single walker is killed as an unintended consequence of
this action. Should we say then nevertheless that the bystander kills the
single walker? For, hadn’t the bystander turned the switch, the single walker
hadn’t died. It looks the same as if the bystander had killed some by accident.
In order to solve this problem we must look at
assumption I. The reason why we say that the bystander kills the single walker
is that this assumption gives us only the possibilities to say either that the
bystander does something (turning the switch) and then it follows that he kills
the single walker; or that the bystander allows something to happen (the switch
leave as it is) but then the single walker survives and the five people die.
Since the bystander turned the switch, we must say that he killed the single
walker. However, as we have seen in my blog last week, the bipartite
distinction between doing and allowing harm is not correct and must be replaced
by the tripartite distinction between doing, allowing and enabling harm. And if
we do so, then we need no longer to say that the bystander killed the single
walker, but that by turning the switch he enabled
that the single walker was killed
(namely by the trolley).
I think that introducing the category of enabling in
the debate will put the trolley problem in a new light and maybe it will make
that much reasoning on the theme must be revised. One thing that might be
changed is the principle quoted above. I think that it’s true that (1) killing
five is worse than killing one. It may also be arguabel that (2) killing one is
worse than letting five die. However, now we should add a lemma like (3)
letting five die is worse than enabling one being killed – assuming that it is
possible to defend this view (which I am not yet sure of, since it depends a
lot on the conditions that occur).
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