French war cemetery and ossuary Douaumont for soldiers killed
in the Battle of Verdun (1916) in the First World War
in the Battle of Verdun (1916) in the First World War
Sometimes I have the impression that history repeats itself; not in the sense of a feeling of déjà vu, which is not more than a feeling of recurrence, but in the sense of a real recurrence, albeit it adapted to the changed circumstances. Take for instance the present Russia-Ukraine War. First of all, it is a unique war in a unique time of history, the Nuclear Age. It’s also an almost direct clash between two superpowers, Russia and the USA, in which the latter is supported by its NATO allies. Moreover, it is a kind of border conflict between military powers in which one power – Russia – tries to regain lost territory, which was – in its view – illegally annexed by the other power, the USA and its allies. In that sense the war is not really new. Think of the Korean War (1950-1953) and the Vietnam War (1955-1975), which were the most important border conflicts between the superpowers after World War Two. Without a doubt there are resemblances between these wars and the Russia-Ukraine War, but that is not what I mean when I say that in the latter war history repeats itself. The differences between the three wars just mentioned are probably bigger than their similarities. No, what strikes me in the present Russia-Ukraine War is that it is not so much a recurrence o
f other border conflicts between great powers but of one of the most important direct clashes ever between big powers, namely the First World War (the “Great War”), which raged in Europe and in the world a century ago, between 1914 and 1918. The similarities between the Russia-Ukraine War and the First World War are the more striking, if you see the former not as a war between Russia and Ukraine but, as said, as a direct clash between the superpowers Russia and the USA and its allies. For isn’t it so that especially in the European Union (but also in Switzerland, which is not an EU member) they say that Ukraine fights “for us”; that it defends democracy against the authoritarian Russia “for us”?
Be it as it may, when saying that history repeats itself in this war, in the first place I think of the military events and less so of the political background. What then are the military similarities between the Russia-Ukraine War and the Great War? Here are the most important ones:
- In August 1914 Germany attacked France and Belgium, expecting that the resulting war would be short and that soon it could occupy Paris, just as in 1871. However, especially the Belgian resistance was stronger than expected. The German advance went slower than hoped and in the end was stopped at the First Battle of the Marne (5-12 September 1914). In the present Russia-Ukraine War also Russia thought to make a quick victory and that it could easily take Kiev, the Ukrainian capital. However, strong Ukrainian resistance and adverse conditions of the ground made that the attack was stopped.
- Frustrated by the Belgian and French resistance the often-inexperienced German troops committed war crimes by killing innocent civilians. In Ukraine we have seen the same: Frustrated by the Ukrainian resistance the often-inexperienced Russian troops committed war crimes by killing innocent civilians.
- After having lost the Battle of the Marne the German troops withdrew and took the best positions. After having been stopped in the Kiev area, the Russian troops withdrew from there and concentrated there where they now see the best chances to win.
- Since direct attacks had failed, the war switched to a kind of trench war: both sides dig in in trenches which function as lines of defence against attacks from the other side. We have seen this in World War One and we see it now in the Russia-Ukraine War.
- Since direct infantry attacks on trenches have no sense or are difficult, because the defenders are in the best position, artillery gets a significant role in breaking the resistance of the enemy and preparing infantry attacks.
So far the analogies between the present Russia-Ukraine War and the First World War. We don’t know how the present war will develop. But the First World War lasted long and became a war of attrition ending with a victory for France and its allies after many setbacks during the first war years. It will be in the future, whether the Russia-Ukraine War will develop in the same way. Anyway, some lessons can be learned from the parallels between both wars. Just as in 1914, also now in 2022 the attacking party overestimated its own strength and underestimated the strength (and the will power!) of the defending party. It is a general human mistake: Most people think that they are better, stronger, more powerful etc. than they really are. People overestimate themselves and think that they are better than average. It’s a common mistake in thought. People forget that as many people are better than average as there are worse. Even if they realize this logical truth, even then they think that they at least will succeed. But you can better be a pessimist of your own capacities, for whom we call a pessimist usually is a realist. And that is what we see again and again: Overoptimism is a recurrent fact in history. Another recurrent fact in history is that most of us ignore this fact. Then history repeats itself in the same old pitfalls.
1 comment:
Pretty sure it does. Part of this is a question of Jung's synchronicity, which is much akin to chance, luck, or whatever you choose to believe. The greater part, I think, is our refusal to pay attention: the very thing of which we were accused, when grades were low and future prospects in peril. Like most everything else, complexity throws wrenches into the machinery of time. The Oracle of the prairie, Stuart Kaufman---maybe with two f's, wrote about this in At Home in the Universe. See, it is like this: we were paying attention in school. Those of us who are still alive, due to natural causes---or the beneficial care money can buy.Trouble is was, and will be, there is no concerted effort to minimize the effects of complexity, nor to learn things from historical errors. Dan Dennett must have been hinting at this when he said making mistakes was OK. But, his admonition was too singular;too individualized. And, he was not, overtly, portraying himself as wise. Enough now.I hope my point is clear Does this answer the question? No.
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