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Those who do not think themselves are thought by others.

Rudolf Rocker (1873-1958), German anarchist and writer

Moralistic fallacy

Now that I have given quite a lot of attention to morality in my last blogs (and not only in my last blogs). I think that it’s the right moment to treat the so-called “moralistic fallacy”, a fallacy that is related to wishful thinking. It is the inverse of the naturalistic fallacy, also called the is/ought fallacy.
There are two versions of the moralistic fallacy, a positive one and a negative one. The positive version says that it occurs when someone asserts “that something is a particular way because it should or ought to be that way.” (Foresman) We could also say: The moralistic fallacy occurs when someone asserts that the way things should be or ought to be is the way they naturally are. The negative version says that the moralistic fallacy occurs when someone asserts “that something cannot be a particular way because it should not or ought not to be that way.” (ibid.) Or, alternatively, what should not be or ought not to be in a particular way is not or will not be so. The fallacy implies that what is immoral is unnatural. The moralistic fallacy is closely related to wishful thinking, as said: The speaker wishes the world to be in a certain way – in this case in a certain moral way – so the world is in that way. The – moral – wish makes speaker blind to the facts.
A variation of the moralistic fallacy is the claim that certain behaviour is natural, since it is based on certain moral values, even if there is contradicting evidence; or a moral claim is simply used to justify a factual claim about the world. It can be found in legal reasoning, prudential reasoning, or reasoning regarding proper etiquette, aesthetics, humour, appropriate emotional responses, etc. I don’t like it to shave myself, so I do it only now and then. In the past, people often saw me as a “tramp” since a decent guy must be well-shaven. At the border, I was always checked. But since several years this has changed, for nowadays, looking unshaven (without having a real beard) is for men in fashion. Although I am still the same person, people see me now in a different way. A moral idea determined a social fact in the minds of those who had it; mistakenly. And, another example, who doesn’t like sometimes a distasteful joke? That the joke is distasteful doesn’t make it not funny just for that reason, although many people think it does.
More commonly, so Foresman, the moralistic fallacy occurs in everyday thinking when one assumes that what is right is what will be. For instance, this happens if a teacher thinks that the students will not cheat because it is not allowed. Or if someone thinks that people will vote because it is their moral obligation. However, it is not so that moral views cannot have practical consequences. They can. So it’s quite possible that the students don’t cheat, since it’s not allowed and therefore you simply don’t do it. Or that people vote, because they feel a moral obligation to do so. Also promises are often fulfilled because you must keep your promises. In other words, morality can affect how the world is and what the facts will be but it doesn’t necessarily do so.

Sources
- Galen Foresman, “Moralistic Fallacy”, in Robert Arp; Steven Barbone; Michael Bruce (eds.), Bad arguments. 100 of the most important fallacies in Western philosophy. Oxford, etc.: Wiley Blackwell, 2019; pp. 371-373.
- Moralistic Fallacy, in Wikipedia.

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We don't sink quickly but regularly.

Maurits Dekker (1896-1962), Dutch author

Morality and passion

In his A Treatise of Human Nature David Hume famously wrote: “’Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.” (Book II, Part III, Section 3) Although, at first sight, this seems unreasonable, nevertheless at second sight it isn’t. Or rather it is not so when we agree with Hume’s argument. For according to Hume, we are guided by our passions: “A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification.” So, passions are basic and “’tis impossible, therefore, that [a] passion can be oppos’d by or contradictory to truth and reason…” According to Hume, there are only two exceptions that a passion can be contrary to reason. First, when it is only supposed to exist but in reality it doesn’t, and, second, when the means chosen to achieve a passion are wrong. Thus seen, indeed, it is not irrational “to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger”, but also it is also “not contrary to reason for me to chuse [= choose] my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me. ‘Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledg’d lesser good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection for the former than for the latter.” Indeed, these examples make the preference of the scratching of my finger to the destruction of the world somewhat less banal and better to understand as “not contrary to reason”, though, I think, it can be argued that Hume’s examples are irrational because just in these cases reason can undermine the passion in view of Hume’s two exceptions.

Nevertheless, I think that there is a flaw in Hume’s argument. In fact, according to Hume, reason is a kind of executive agency of the passions, also in case of the two exceptions. However, it is quite possible that reason is also an “original existence” alongside passions. According to Hume, “reason alone can never produce any action, or give rise to volition” (or prevent volition), and just this makes reason subordinate to and an executive agency of the passions. But I think that reason itself can be seen as a kind of passion, namely as a drive to have to be rational. And just as a combat between passions is possible (for example between love and revenge; like in my last blog, when Otto tried to kill Poppea), it is also imaginable that reason fights with a passion, especially when such a passion can be seen as unreasonable from another perspective that is also basic. One such other perspective is morality. Morality is independent of reason, so Hume, and “morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions.” (II, III, 2) In this way, morality can even be seen as more basic than the passions. Then, in a derived sense, not to want to have my finger scratched in favour of the salvation of the world is as yet irrational if it is contrary to my moral principles (and therefore immoral). It is true, from the narrow perspective that only passions are basic reason can only be the executive agent of a passion. However, as an independent driving force it can be used as the executive agent of any basic drive, or original existence, as Hume calls it. From such a wider perspective, the scratch of my finger can certainly be irrational and unreasonable as well, for instance, when we take our moral values as our starting point or see them even as preceding our passions.

When I wanted to announce my last blog in several social media, as I always do, I started to write “Power is often preferred to morality” and then Hume’s statement popped up in my mind, which, in the end, I didn’t add. But look around how people behave, politicians in the first place. How many behave as if they don’t want to have their fingers scratched (or maybe their souls) and prefer the destruction of the world instead, ignoring morality. Isn’t that a crime?

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When a communist opponent said that the proletariat will determine what we’ll do, Albert de Jong replied: “When you say that the proletariat will determine what we’ll do, in fact this means that I, the dictator, will determine what we’ll do, while, when I say that I will determine what I’ll do, this may sound individualistic, but only then it is really the proletariat that determines what we’ll do.”

Albert de Jong (1891-1970), Dutch anarchist

Morality and power

Oradour-sur-Glane, France: Massacred and destroyed by the Nazis out of revenge,
 10 June 1944.

Being moral or exercising power. Often it is a contradiction and often we think that there is no other option than to choose the one or the other; in daily life, let alone as a politician, certainly if you are a politician at the top of the – or a – power structure. And how often don’t we opt for power instead of morality? I am afraid that too often we do. Especially, many at the top choose power, even in case morality is a real option.
I had to think of this when, two weeks ago, I saw Monteverdi’s opera L’Incoronazione di Poppea in the City Theatre of Utrecht, performed by the Dutch Touring Opera. The opera was first performed in 1643 in Venice. The musical introduction to the opera presents it as a battle between morality and love, in which love wins, but actually the opera is about morality and power, and, as so often, power wins. I think it is what Claudio Monteverdi (1567-1643) wanted to tell us, but in his time, in Italy in the first part of the 16th century, often you could not say your message openly, so he concealed the real message behind a more innocent theme, namely the struggle between Virtu and Amor.
But first the story (from the website above):

The Roman emperor Nero is in love with the courtesan Poppea. He wants to take her to wife and cast off his lawful wife Ottavia. Nero’s teacher Seneca considers these plans morally and politically objectionable and must pay for his opposition with forced suicide. The desperate Ottavia decides to have Poppea murdered and forces Otto, Poppea’s former lover, to perform the attack. Otto seeks the help of Drusilla, whom he had left for Poppea at the time. Torn with love and resentment, Otto, wrapped in Drusilla’s cloak, sneaks up on the sleeping Poppea. However, the murder is foiled by Amor, who promises to ensure that Poppea is crowned Empress that same day. Drusilla, whose cloak has been recognized, is arrested and taken to Nero, who questions her sharply. To protect Otto, she takes all the blame. When Otto hears this, he tells the true facts. He is exiled, and Drusilla may accompany him as a reward for her loyalty. Nero now has good reason to cast out Ottavia and banishes her from Rome for good, and Poppea is crowned empress.

In short, L’Incoronazione di Poppea is an opera in which moral values are put aside and power, greed and relations determine what the personages do. At first sight, it seems like another fictional complicated opera story, but in fact it is based on historical facts. Nero really did take Poppea, the wife of his friend Otto, for instance, and cast out his wife Ottavia. And Seneca, the teacher of Nero, was really forced to commit suicide, though in reality because Nero thought that he had taken part in a conspiracy (whether Seneca really did is not certain). Etc. But what Monteverdi (and his librettist Giovanni Francesco Busenello) presents us here actually is a complicated network of power and intrigues. Ted Huffman, the director of this performance of the opera, explains that the opera is about political and moral questions that are still relevant today: “At the moment that Europe balances on the brink of war, we are concerned with questions such as: What happens if our moral values are no longer worth anything? … What can we do, while we see that the world order collapses? Can reason and goodness stop the decline? How to deal with the violent destruction of a social order by a psychopathic autocrat? Just these are the questions presented by Monteverdi in the opera.” But actually, it is not only Nero, it is not only the autocrat, who uses power at the cost of morality, but all those who become included in the play and so get involved in it, are not only onlookers and victims. They are participants. Huffman: “For example, is it so that Poppea becomes immoral, because Nero uses all his means to separate from his wife Ottavia, so that he can marry Poppea, … [or] is it so that Poppea can live with Nero’s misdeeds and abuse of power? We can ask such questions also for other personages. Take Seneca: Isn’t it maybe so that he tried to prevent the repudiation of Ottavia in order to keep his own power at the court?” We can say something like that of every personage in the opera: Each one thinks to have reasons to use power at the cost of morality. “None of the characters in the opera thinks to be guilty or blameworthy – just like in real life, when nobody wants to be the bad guy”, and, as I want to add, nobody thinks to be a bad guy or bad girl. This is so for Poppea, and for Seneca and for all characters in the opera. Nobody, once involved in the play, considers the possibility that there may be other options and everybody stays on the stage and plays his or her part. Nevertheless, other options were possible, for wasn’t it so that a few years later the real historic Nero was deposed by the Senate (the equivalent of the modern parliament or Congress) because of his misconduct? Power doesn’t need to exclude morality. It’s something to think about, even when you have become involved in a play in which you didn’t want to have a part.
Need I explain more about the relevance of L’Incoronazione di Poppea? With this opera, Monteverdi wanted to criticize the political and social world of his days, but also 400 years later it still holds up a mirror to us. 

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Such as make it their business to oversee human actions, do not find themselves in anything so much perplexed as to reconcile them and bring them into the world’s eye with the same lustre and reputation; for they commonly so strangely contradict one another that it seems impossible they should proceed from one and the same person.

Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592)

Euphemism

Person without permanent residence

Who controls the language controls the mind. Philosophically, there is a lot to say about this statement that undermines its truth (For instance: Who controls the language of the controller?). However, despite philosophical doubts, in practice it works often that way. One who has best described the working of mind control by language is George Orwell. His 1984 and Animal Farm have seldom been so relevant as today. Whether they have read Orwell’s works or haven’t, many politicians know the value of this statement, and they apply it; not only for convincing the public and their potential voters but also for manipulating them. Language is often used for pushing people in a certain direction, while concealing their real intentions; by politicians in the first place, but certainly not only by them.
Manipulating the public is often done by means of fallacies: Argumentations in which the conclusions don’t follow from the premisses. Another way to manipulate others with words is by giving them a vague meaning. Often there isn’t much difference between the one and the other. Using vague words often leads to fallacies. Actually, if your intention is to manipulate with words, it’s not important whether these words belong to the first category or to the second. Only the effect counts.
Manipulating your public by softening the meaning of your words or with vague meanings means using euphemisms. A euphemism is “a delicate, indirect, inoffensive, or vague word or phrase that takes the place of one that is unpleasant, blunt, offensive or graphic.” (Baltzer-Jaray, p. 270) Euphemisms are often used, when you don’t want to hurt the feelings of those you are talking to and want to be polite, or when you want to avoid directly talking about certain subjects, like death and sex. However, it is not what I want to talk about now. Here I want to discuss euphemisms as instruments for thought manipulation and by this the way people behave. I’ll concentrate on the former and let the behavioural aspect implicit. Then we see (following Baltzer-Jaray) that euphemistic language is used for:
- preventing inappropriately stirring people’s emotions by using neutral terms like calling homeless people “people without permanent residence”, or mentally disabled people “people with abilities”. When many years ago the first migrant workers from Southern Europe and Morocco arrived in the Netherlands, they were called “guest workers”, concealing that they were poorly paid, did often dirty and heavy work and were badly housed.
- swaying people’s opinions or emotions to a particular side, for example when torture is called “enhanced interrogation”, or non-combatant civilian victims in a war are called “collateral damage”.
- concealing a person’s role in responsibility for a bad deed, for example when it is said that someone has not been killed but “neutralized”, or that a government has “disinformed” the parliament instead of having lied.
Such euphemisms are “fallacious”, so Baltzer-Jaray, “because they are intentionally used to conceal the truth and obscure any real meaning; they are soft language used to mask or downplay warranted emotional force.” In other words, they are instruments of manipulation. They make you think less critically and suppress your feelings. That’s the political side. As said, in daily life euphemism are also often used, and there they can have a positive side as well. However, in advertising often weasel words are used to seduce you to buy certain products. Such words “appear to say something truthful or meaningful, but really they conceal truth and meaning”. So, if a product “combats wrinkles” and “dermatology experts agree skin appears smoother”, such a recommendation in an advertisement seldom says to what extent it will probably be successful (1%, 25%, 75%?) and which experts say so and what is meant by “skin appears smoother”.
Euphemistic words and expressions are often used to mislead. Once you have fallen into the trap and believe them in their literal sense and doesn’t see the deception behind the euphemistically used words, maybe you’ll vote for a politician because of these words, or buy a product that is misleadingly advertised to be good. And that’s just what the politician, advertiser or whoever wants to mislead you with euphemisms intends.

Sources
- Baltzer-Jaray, Kimberley, “Euphemism”, in Arp, Robert; Steven Barbone; Michael Bruce (eds.), Bad arguments. 100 of the most important fallacies in Western philosophy. Oxford, etc.: Wiley Blackwell, 2019; pp. 270-272.
- “Euphemism”, in Wikipedia.

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The brain is part of the mind; but the mind is not part of the brain.

Markus Gabriel (1980-)