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Monday, May 19, 2025

Morality and passion


In his A Treatise of Human Nature David Hume famously wrote: “’Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.” (Book II, Part III, Section 3) Although, at first sight, this seems unreasonable, nevertheless at second sight it isn’t. Or rather it is not so when we agree with Hume’s argument. For according to Hume, we are guided by our passions: “A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification.” So, passions are basic and “’tis impossible, therefore, that [a] passion can be oppos’d by or contradictory to truth and reason…” According to Hume, there are only two exceptions that a passion can be contrary to reason. First, when it is only supposed to exist but in reality it doesn’t, and, second, when the means chosen to achieve a passion are wrong. Thus seen, indeed, it is not irrational “to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger”, but also it is also “not contrary to reason for me to chuse [= choose] my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me. ‘Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledg’d lesser good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection for the former than for the latter.” Indeed, these examples make the preference of the scratching of my finger to the destruction of the world somewhat less banal and better to understand as “not contrary to reason”, though, I think, it can be argued that Hume’s examples are irrational because just in these cases reason can undermine the passion in view of Hume’s two exceptions.
Nevertheless, I think that there is a flaw in Hume’s argument. In fact, according to Hume, reason is a kind of executive agency of the passions, also in case of the two exceptions. However, it is quite possible that reason is also an “original existence” alongside passions. According to Hume, “reason alone can never produce any action, or give rise to volition” (or prevent volition), and just this makes reason subordinate to and an executive agency of the passions. But I think that reason itself can be seen as a kind of passion, namely as a drive to have to be rational. And just as a combat between passions is possible (for example between love and revenge; like in my last blog, when Otto tried to kill Poppea), it is also imaginable that reason fights with a passion, especially when such a passion can be seen as unreasonable from another perspective that is also basic. One such other perspective is morality. Morality is independent of reason, so Hume, and “morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions.” (II, III, 2) In this way, morality can even be seen as more basic than the passions. Then, in a derived sense, not to want to have my finger scratched in favour of the salvation of the world is as yet irrational if it is contrary to my moral principles (and therefore immoral). It is true, from the narrow perspective that only passions are basic reason can only be the executive agent of a passion. However, as an independent driving force it can be used as the executive agent of any basic drive, or original existence, as Hume calls it. From such a wider perspective, the scratch of my finger can certainly be irrational and unreasonable as well, for instance, when we take our moral values as our starting point or see them even as preceding our passions.

When I wanted to announce my last blog in several social media, as I always do, I started to write “Power is often preferred to morality” and then Hume’s statement popped up in my mind, which, in the end, I didn’t add. But look around how people behave, politicians in the first place. How many behave as if they don’t want to have their fingers scratched (or maybe their souls) and prefer the destruction of the world instead, ignoring morality. Isn’t that a crime?

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