For many years I was interested in the questions what
causes are and what reasons are and how they help explain what happens in the
world and understand what people do. Gradually my philosophical interests
strayed away from these questions to other issues and my blogs reflect the new
paths I have taken. However, I have never lost my sympathy for these old themes
and now and then they come back into my mind. Sometimes they simply pop up and
sometimes other people let them pop up. The latter was the case for instance
when I was asked to give my opinion on an article about Fred Dretske’s theory
of mental causation. Much can be said on Dretske’s theory and I, too, have
written a critical comment on it, but what I have never forgotten from the book
Explaining Behavior. Reasons in a World
of Causes, where Dretske expounds his theory, is his view on the concept of
cause. Most of what I read soon slips my mind again, but when I happen to think
about “cause” for any reason whatsoever one of the first approaches I always remember is Dretske’s. Especially in
practical situations Dretske’s concept is very useful, since it helps disentangle
complex occurrences or convoluted argumentations.
In fact, Dretske distinguishes two concepts of cause,
namely “triggering cause” and “structuring cause”. When we ask what the causes
of a process are, we can answer this question in two ways, so Dretske. Either we
can look for the event that triggers the process, and then Dretske speaks of
the “triggering cause”; or we
can look for the background conditions that made that this process has a
certain form or structure, so that it is M1 and not M2 that is the
consequence of a certain event or state. Then, Dretske speaks of the “structuring cause”. A temperature
drop causing to occur certain events in the thermostat, while in turn these events cause the
furnace to ignite, is an example of a triggering cause. The structuring cause
is what makes that the thermostat turns the furnace on and does not open to
garage door, for instance, when it becomes cold. And this can happen either
because the thermostat is wired to the furnace in a certain way, or because the
electrician wired it that way. So structuring causes can be of two kinds: “(1)
the background conditions that enable the one thing to cause the other or (2)
whatever earlier event or condition that brought about these background
conditions” (Dretske 1988, 42). There is also a difference in time perspective
between a triggering cause and a structuring cause. The former makes that the
process takes place now; the latter concerns already
existing relationships that have been made in the past. (id., 37-50, 114-115)
Dretske’s distinction is an important philosophical
contribution to the discussion on what we mean by “cause”. Moreover, as said,
it is also very practical. A car slips in a bend of the road and collides with
another car. Was it a mistake by the driver, because he was distracted, or is
it a faulty construction of the bend that makes that many cars slip there? Then
we ask whether a triggering cause or a structuring cause brought about the
accident.
Dretske has made many other important contributions to
philosophy, especially to epistemology and to the philosophy of mind. But his
idea that had most influence on my thinking is this distinction between
triggering and structuring causes, which I often use when it is relevant. It
makes that I’ll keep remembering him for Fred Dretske died on July 24 this
year, 79 years old.
Sources: my “Dretske and the causality
of reasons” on http://home.kpn.nl/wegweeda/DretskeEng.htm; Fred Dretske, Explaining
Behavior. Reasons in a World of Causes, MIT: Cambridge, Mass. etc., 1988.
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