The author's memory
What makes
a person P2 at time t2 the same person as person P1
at time t1? Following Locke (1689/1975), in contemporary analytical
philosophy, this question is usually answered in psychological terms, to wit by
specifying a psychological criterion that shows, when continuity or
connectedness between P1 en P2 exists: Memory. Although currently
memory is no longer seen as the only criterion of personal identity, it is
still considered an important determinant of personal identity over time. As a
rule reference is made to only episodic
memory, so to certain events or experiences in the life of the individual
concerned. Other kinds of memory, like semantic memory and implicit
non-conscious kinds of memory, are generally ignored by the mainstream of
personal identity theorists when they consider what makes a person a person. So
it is episodic memory that makes that the little schoolboy who went to school
in a provincial capital in the Netherlands is the same person as the man who
writes this blog on one of the first days of July 2017. Of course, everybody
forgets many of his or her life experiences, but personal identity theorists
have thought out several solutions for overcoming this problem of forgetfulness.
But is episodic memory really a reliable criterion for personal identity?
When
someone forgets about what s/he did or experienced in the past, determining the
personal identity is a matter of reconstructing
the connection between the person who acted in a certain way some time ago or
who experienced then this or that and the person who s/he is now. However, if
s/he explicitly remembers what s/he
did it seems obvious that the person in the memory and the person now who
remembers are the same. But is it really so that we can say that what a man or
woman remembers now as something that s/he lived through or experienced some
time ago makes him or her the same person as the one in the recollection?
Much has already been written about the unreliability
of our memory but I think that the next investigation well substantiates my
point:
Memory expert Julia Shaw selected a group of test
subjects for what was allegedly a study on emotional memory. First she asked
each participant about his or her memory of a true emotional event which Shaw
had learned from a person who had informed her about the participant. It might
be being bullied at school, fainting on vacation or something else. Next Shaw
introduced a false event, telling the test subjects they did something that she
knew they actually did not, like telling the participants that they had
committed a crime with police contact – assault, assault with a weapon, or
theft – or had experienced another emotional event – an animal attack, a bodily
injury, losing a large sum of money or getting in trouble with their parents.
Shaw did as if someone the test subject knew, like his/her parents, had
informed her about the event. At first the participants said correctly that
they didn’t remember the event. After a visualisation exercise, which gave the
test subjects access to their imagination instead of their memories – which
they didn’t know – the participants still hadn’t much to tell about the event.
Then they were sent home with the instruction not to talk about the test and to
try to visualise the memory at home. One week later in a second interview the
test subjects were asked to tell both about the true emotional event and about
the false event. Many participants began to “remember” and report of details of
the false event. The visualisation exercise was also repeated. Next the
participant were sent home again with the instruction of trying to get more
details of the false event. One week later in a third interview the second
interview session was repeated. “After three interviews”, so Shaw, “... many
participants are divulging a tremendous number of details about an event that
never happened, talking about them with confidence.” In other words: The false
events had really become part of the memories of the test subjects. Don’t think
that only exceptional persons “recollect” false memories. Shaw found in her
investigations that at least 70% of the participants develop full false
memories about criminal and emotional events. Most of us will do in the right
circumstances.
Perhaps you think that Shaw’s case is extreme. Maybe
it is, but as Shaw shows in her book: Everybody’s mind is probably full of
false memories. There are many reasons why we get them and it is unlikely that
anybody is free of them.
What does this mean for the view that episodic memory
is the most important
determinant of man’s personal identity as the mainstream of personal identity
theorists maintains? On the base of a false memory each of us could be a
criminal while s/he is in fact a honest burgher. Even more, as Shaw makes
clear, it also happens often that we adopt recollections told to us by others
as if they were our own. If so this would mean – following the mainstream of
the personal identity theorists – that such a recollection would give the
person with the adopted recollection the personal identity of another person,
at least partly. It would literally put him or her in someone else’s shoes. The
upshot is: What we remember may be important for us but it doesn’t make our
identities. Only what we really lived through and experienced does, but it’s not
obvious that we remember all of it nor that we lived through and experienced
everything that we remember.
References
- John Locke,
An essay concerning Human Understanding.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975 (1689).
- Noonan,
Harold W., Personal Identity. London
etc.: Routledge, 2003.
- Shaw, Julia, The memory illusion. London: Random
House Books, 2016. You can find the case described on pp. 171-175.
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