Wittgenstein and Spinoza

Has Wittgenstein been influenced by Spinoza? It is a question that haunted my mind already for some time, so now that I had written a few blogs on Spinoza again, I thought that it was a good idea to sort it out at last and to search for the answer on the Internet. The result was meagre but the answer is clear: Yes, Wittgenstein has been influenced by Spinoza, indeed. Probably Wittgenstein has even read some texts by Spinoza as a schoolboy, for such texts were read on the type of school he visited. However, how big has this influence been? In fact, as far as I know and could find out, Wittgenstein mentions Spinoza’s name only once, and then it is not in one of his philosophical works but in his war diary. Actually, the reference to Spinoza is a bit weird. Immediately after the outbreak of the First World War Wittgenstein decided to volunteer in the Austrian army. Then, on 15 September 1914 – one month in service – he writes in his diary: “The Russians are on our heels! The enemy is very close to us. Am in a good mood. Have worked [=philosophized] again. I can work best now while peeling potatoes. I always volunteer for it. It is for me what lens-grinding was for Spinoza.” Here, Stan Verdult adds in his blog: “Then you do feel a touch of identification”.

However, identification is not the same as being influenced by. If there is any work by Wittgenstein that has been influenced by Spinoza, it is the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP). This work has been written originally in German and the title was [translated] Logical Philosophical Treatise. When the work was published in English, G.E. Moore suggested the Latin title as homage to Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus and Wittgenstein agreed. This is not really strange, for not only held Wittgenstein apparently the Dutch philosopher in high esteem, but a closer look at the TLP shows that its structure has some similarity with the structure of Spinoza’s Ethics. Both works are characterized by a mathematical structure and decimal arrangements.

Also the text of the TLP shows here and there a touch of Spinozism, especially in section 6, where Wittgenstein writes:

6.4311 ... If by eternity is understood not endless temporal duration but timelessness, then he lives eternally who lives in the present. ...

6.4312 ... The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time. ...

6.432 How the world is, is completely indifferent for what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world.

6.4321 The facts all belong only to the task and not to its performance.

6.44 Not how the world is, is the mystical, but that it is.

6.45 The contemplation of the world sub specie aeterni is its contemplation as a limited whole.

The feeling of the world as a limited whole is the mystical feeling.

This can be read as a reference to Spinoza, but unlike Spinoza, Wittgenstein has placed God outside the world, while for Spinoza, the world is God (“Deus sive Natura”, “God or Nature”, as Spinoza says.) It’s a kind of criticism on Spinoza. But Wittgenstein doesn’t mention Spinoza here, for Wittgenstein only rarely mentions names in his works. To what or whom Wittgenstein’s words refer must be find out by the reader. This makes Wittgenstein’s work so difficult to interpret and altogether I think that the similarity between the TLP and Spinoza’s work is quite meagre. Then, the further Wittgenstein has left the TLP behind him in time, the less Spinoza we can see in his work. In his other main work the Philosophical Investigations – finished 30 years after the TLP – I can see no relationship with Spinoza at all. My conclusion is then that Wittgenstein valued Spinoza a lot and that Spinoza’s thoughts have touched Wittgenstein here and there early in his philosophical career. More is mere speculation.

References and Sources

- Baum, Wilhelm, Wittgenstein im Ersten Weltkrieg. Die „Geheimen Tagebücher“ und die Erfahrungen an der Front 1914-1918). Klagenfurt-Wien: Kitab Verlag 2014.

- “Daarover moet men zwijgen”, https://webapp.fkt.uvt.nl/gfo/default/index/witi-lk4

- Verdult, Stan, “Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) De wereld is al wat het geval is - één werkelijkheid, een onzegbaarheidstheorie en Spinoza”, http://blog.despinoza.nl/log/ludwig-wittgenstein-1889-1951-de-wereld-is-al-wat-het-geval-is-een-werkelijkheid-een-onzegbaarheidstheorie-en-spinoza.html

- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/5740/5740-pdf.pdf

Methods as rules for the mind

When Spinoza was working on his Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, he intended to write a method that would lead to true knowledge. In this blog I’ll ignore what true knowledge is. It’s even debatable whether such a thing exists. However, also in case there is no true knowledge in science and the humanities, we can consider it an ideal that we strive for. Then the question is: What is a good method that will bring us true knowledge? According to Spinoza, a good method “shows us how the mind should be directed, according to the standard of the given true idea.” (38) But what is the standard of the given true idea? I think that much can be said about it, but I find Spinoza’s description of method in his Treatise vague and obscure and of little help for modern thinking. However, Spinoza at least tried to answer the question what a method is. In later discussions until today it has often been ignored, even when it was essential (for example even Hempel and Popper didn’t define method). This a strange, for if we are talking about methods and their use – and methods are the heart of science and the humanities –, isn’t it then important to know what we are talking about?

In order to answer this question on method, I think that especially Abraham Kaplan’s The conduct of inquiry is useful. In this book, Kaplan distinguishes two kinds of methodology, namely a methodology that studies specific practical scientific techniques and a methodology that studies the general philosophical principles behind these techniques. Only in the latter case Kaplan talks of methods, and therefore I think that it would be better to call the other type of methodology a theory of techniques. So while techniques are things like questionnaires, experiments or scales, following Kaplan we can define methods as the “logical or philosophical principles sufficiently specific to relate especially to science as distinguished from other human enterprises or interests. [They] include such procedures as forming concepts and hypotheses, making observations and measurements, performing experiments, building models and theories, providing explanations, and making predictions” (Kaplan, 1964: 23; italics mine). In short, techniques are concrete and apply to this or that research or investigation; methods are abstract and basically they apply to all sciences and humanities or at least to a significant part of them.

Of course, much more can said about this, but I think it is enough for this blog. Although I don’t want to give an interpretation of Spinoza’s definition here in the sense of explaining what Spinoza meant, I think that Kaplan’s description of method can give an interpretation of Spinoza’s definition that satisfies us. Spinoza says that a good method should “show us how the mind should be directed, according to the standard of the given true idea”. (see above) Now we can say that a good method should give us the logical or philosophical principles and procedures that lead our mind to true knowledge. In this sense, methods are rules for the mind.

Just one more thing. Some people say that science is just another opinion. And then these people set the facts as they see them against the scientific facts they don’t agree with. I think that this is not a correct approach if you want to reject scientific results. This approach assumes that science is about facts, although actually science is about methods (and techniques as well): The essence of science is the right method. So if you think that a scientific result is not correct, false or even fake, basically you must not attack the result but the way that led to this result, so the method. Only if you have shown that the method used is not right, or that mistakes have been made in its application (or the same so for the techniques used) you have shown that a result is not correct or even fake.

Sources

- Full texts in English of Spinoza’s Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect: http://www.yesselman.com/teielwes.htm

- Kaplan, Abraham, The conduct of inquiry. Methodology for behavioral science. Scranton, Penna.: Chandler Publishing Cy.,1964.

Spinoza’s Rules for the Mind

The present Waterlooplein (Waterloo Square) in Amsterdam. Once here was
the heart of the Jewish Quarter. Spinoza has passed his youth here and for
some time his parents had a house where now the church in the photo is.

Just like Descartes, also Spinoza has written down rules for the mind. Or, rather, he had the intention to do so, for like Descartes also Spinoza didn’t complete his book and he left his Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect – which should contain these rules – unfinished. Spinoza seems to have worked almost his whole philosophical life on it, and judging his own remarks, it had to consist of four parts on method, plus an introductory part and – I assume –also a kind of conclusion. However, he has written only a few introductory sections, the first part of the method on “fictive, false and doubtful ideas”, and a few pages of the second part on the essence of the intellect. Then the manuscripts breaks off.

For my blog I have read a Dutch translation of this Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione with explanations by Theo Verbeek. According to him, the Tractatus can better be seen as an introduction to Spinoza’s philosophy than a method. Maybe, he is right, or maybe he comes to his conclusion only because the work is unfinished. For, indeed, what remains of the book is mainly introductory. But when Spinoza would have completed the work, maybe we would have considered it a real method. We’ll never know.

What’s also possible is that Spinoza never intended this work for publication. Maybe for him it was simply a kind of finger exercise meant for developing his own thoughts. It could explain why the work sometimes gives a fragmentary impression and that it is vague and obscure on many places. In line with this, also the remaining part of this blog will consist only of some sketchy remarks on the Tractatus, just for giving you a feeling of what you can expect.

In order to improve our intellect so that we can better understand, we can get knowledge by four kinds of perception, so Spinoza:

I. Perception arising from hearsay or from some sign which everyone may name as he pleases.

II. Perception arising from mere experience, i.e. from experience not yet classified by the intellect.

III. a) Perception of what we call in modern terms a causal relationship (i.e. we see that one event regularly follows after another event) or b) perception by deduction (i.e. when we can infer an event from general propositions).

IV. Perception by seeing the essence of a thing. (see Tractatus, 19).

It’s from these perceptions that we must choose one in order to get knowledge (cf. 25). However, it’s not sufficient for getting knowledge. In addition, we need a method. To my mind, Spinoza says it in a rather complicated way, but I want to summarize it in my own words by saying that the method we need gives us rules that lead to true ideas. Actually, Spinoza aims here at Descartes, if I interpret the text and Verbeek’s explanations well, for what Spinoza wants to say here is that we need the right perception and the right method in order to know nature; only then we can understand our mind. Descartes, on the other hand, starts from the idea of mind – “I think so I am” – and we need this understanding of the mind in order to be able to know nature. (30-43)

What must a method do for us? Spinoza mentions four points, namely 1) it must help distinguish true ideas from other perceptions and help the mind ignore these other perceptions; 2) it must give rules in order to get perceptions of yet unknown ideas; 3) it must give a plan, so that we avoid to do useless things; and 4) it must lead to the idea of the absolute perfect being. However, elaborations of 3) and 4) are lacking in the Tractatus. (49) In part 1, which treats the first point, Spinoza gives explanations about fictive, false and doubtful ideas. In part 2, which was intended to elaborate point 2, he starts to write about the essence of the intellect. Then the manuscript breaks off. In this part Spinoza explains, for instance, what definitions are. A definition must give us, so Spinoza, the essence of a thing; it must not be a simple enumeration of indispensable characteristics. For example, we must not define a circle by saying that it is a figure in which all lines drawn from the centre to the periphery have the same length (which is true), but it is – and now I quite the Wikipedia – “a shape consisting of all points in a plane that are a given distance from a given point, the centre”. Next Spinoza gives further rules for a correct definition, distinguishing between definitions of created things and definitions of uncreated things. (91-97) However, I’ll stop here my introductory remarks on Spinoza’s Tractatus. I hope that it’s enough for enticing you to read the book. For although the writing is often obscure and vague and requires much effort to get a grip on it, nevertheless it’s worth reading if you are interested in Spinoza’s philosophy and want to improve your background for understanding his other works, like the Ethics.

Sources and texts

Full texts in English of the Tractatus: http://www.yesselman.com/teielwes.htm

Full text in Latin: http://www.latinamericanhistory.net/tractatus.html

For this blog I used a Dutch translation of the Tractatus plus the useful explanations by Theo Verbeek: Spinoza, Verhandeling over de verbetering van het verstand. Groningen, Historische Uitgeverij, 2017.