Spinoza’s Rules for the Mind

The present Waterlooplein (Waterloo Square) in Amsterdam. Once here was
the heart of the Jewish Quarter. Spinoza has passed his youth here and for
some time his parents had a house where now the church in the photo is.

Just like Descartes, also Spinoza has written down rules for the mind. Or, rather, he had the intention to do so, for like Descartes also Spinoza didn’t complete his book and he left his Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect – which should contain these rules – unfinished. Spinoza seems to have worked almost his whole philosophical life on it, and judging his own remarks, it had to consist of four parts on method, plus an introductory part and – I assume –also a kind of conclusion. However, he has written only a few introductory sections, the first part of the method on “fictive, false and doubtful ideas”, and a few pages of the second part on the essence of the intellect. Then the manuscripts breaks off.

For my blog I have read a Dutch translation of this Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione with explanations by Theo Verbeek. According to him, the Tractatus can better be seen as an introduction to Spinoza’s philosophy than a method. Maybe, he is right, or maybe he comes to his conclusion only because the work is unfinished. For, indeed, what remains of the book is mainly introductory. But when Spinoza would have completed the work, maybe we would have considered it a real method. We’ll never know.

What’s also possible is that Spinoza never intended this work for publication. Maybe for him it was simply a kind of finger exercise meant for developing his own thoughts. It could explain why the work sometimes gives a fragmentary impression and that it is vague and obscure on many places. In line with this, also the remaining part of this blog will consist only of some sketchy remarks on the Tractatus, just for giving you a feeling of what you can expect.

In order to improve our intellect so that we can better understand, we can get knowledge by four kinds of perception, so Spinoza:

I. Perception arising from hearsay or from some sign which everyone may name as he pleases.

II. Perception arising from mere experience, i.e. from experience not yet classified by the intellect.

III. a) Perception of what we call in modern terms a causal relationship (i.e. we see that one event regularly follows after another event) or b) perception by deduction (i.e. when we can infer an event from general propositions).

IV. Perception by seeing the essence of a thing. (see Tractatus, 19).

It’s from these perceptions that we must choose one in order to get knowledge (cf. 25). However, it’s not sufficient for getting knowledge. In addition, we need a method. To my mind, Spinoza says it in a rather complicated way, but I want to summarize it in my own words by saying that the method we need gives us rules that lead to true ideas. Actually, Spinoza aims here at Descartes, if I interpret the text and Verbeek’s explanations well, for what Spinoza wants to say here is that we need the right perception and the right method in order to know nature; only then we can understand our mind. Descartes, on the other hand, starts from the idea of mind – “I think so I am” – and we need this understanding of the mind in order to be able to know nature. (30-43)

What must a method do for us? Spinoza mentions four points, namely 1) it must help distinguish true ideas from other perceptions and help the mind ignore these other perceptions; 2) it must give rules in order to get perceptions of yet unknown ideas; 3) it must give a plan, so that we avoid to do useless things; and 4) it must lead to the idea of the absolute perfect being. However, elaborations of 3) and 4) are lacking in the Tractatus. (49) In part 1, which treats the first point, Spinoza gives explanations about fictive, false and doubtful ideas. In part 2, which was intended to elaborate point 2, he starts to write about the essence of the intellect. Then the manuscript breaks off. In this part Spinoza explains, for instance, what definitions are. A definition must give us, so Spinoza, the essence of a thing; it must not be a simple enumeration of indispensable characteristics. For example, we must not define a circle by saying that it is a figure in which all lines drawn from the centre to the periphery have the same length (which is true), but it is – and now I quite the Wikipedia – “a shape consisting of all points in a plane that are a given distance from a given point, the centre”. Next Spinoza gives further rules for a correct definition, distinguishing between definitions of created things and definitions of uncreated things. (91-97) However, I’ll stop here my introductory remarks on Spinoza’s Tractatus. I hope that it’s enough for enticing you to read the book. For although the writing is often obscure and vague and requires much effort to get a grip on it, nevertheless it’s worth reading if you are interested in Spinoza’s philosophy and want to improve your background for understanding his other works, like the Ethics.

Sources and texts

Full texts in English of the Tractatus: http://www.yesselman.com/teielwes.htm

Full text in Latin: http://www.latinamericanhistory.net/tractatus.html

For this blog I used a Dutch translation of the Tractatus plus the useful explanations by Theo Verbeek: Spinoza, Verhandeling over de verbetering van het verstand. Groningen, Historische Uitgeverij, 2017.